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ABSTRACT
Literacy Acquisition; Its Implications in
Language Comprehension and Syllogism Solving
February 1982
Julianne R. Gilmore
B.S., Louisiana State University
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Professor Reginald Damerell
This study investigates the hypothesis that the
acquisition of literacy enables more precise comprehen-
sion of language, spoken as well as written. The influ-
ence of literacy acquisition on language comprehension is
demonstrable in rural Third World settings with marginally
literate adults. Solving syllogisms is a difficult task
for non-literate villagers; however, the cause of the
difficulty most people--not merely non-literate villagers
—
have with syllogisms is that the premise is not understood.
Individuals reason on their personal interpretation of the
premise and not on the terms as stated in the problem.
In this respect, performance on syllogisms can be used as
a measure of comprehension of the language of the premise.
To justify the effects of literacy acquisition, a theoreti-
cal argument is constructed that children's comprehension
begins with a heavy dependence on contextual cues for the
VI
meaning of utterances. By late childhood the child develops
greater ability to use linguistic cues—semantic and syn-
tactic--for meaning in language. The acquisition of liter-
acy--the process of understanding language devoid of con-
textual and prosodic cues--is proposed as a catalyst for
refining precise language comprehension by focusing atten-
tion on the semantic and syntactic cues inherent in the
written text.
If syllogism performance is a measure of language
comprehension as well as reasoning, and if the acquisition
of literacy benefits language comprehension, then reading
skill should correlate positively with syllogism perfor-
mance and with remembrance of the syllogism premise. To
test this, 112 marginally literate, rural, adult Jamaican
women were asked to solve four orally presented syllogisms.
Measurements were made of the syllogism solution, recogni-
tion of the premise statements, and reading skill. The
data supported the hypothesized correlations, but also
reflected the role of cultural demands on precise language
comprehension. Correlational studies do not, of course,
provide conclusive evidence of cause and effect. However,
the results are consistent with the theoretical argument
for causality: the acquisition of literacy is one factor
which develops and refines strategies for using semantic
and syntactic cues in the comprehension of language.
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CHAPTER I
PURPOSE OP THE STUDY
Introduction
The purpose of this study, in the broadest terms,
is to describe the relationship between literacy and
language comprehension. Heretofore, it seems the un-
stated assumption by educational psychologists and reading
teachers alike has been that the basis for acquiring
reading skills is oral language comprehension. The vali-
dity of that relationship in many circumstances is not
called into question here. This study seeks to establish
the point that causal relationships may be the reverse as
well--that the acquisition of literacy has a substantial
impact on language comprehension, even when aural.
"Literacy" in the context of this study does not pertain
to literary achievements but rather to the acquisition
of the rudimentary reading skills; and "language compre-
hension, " to understanding simple, logically-related
sentences
.
It is interesting to note that comprehension diffi-
culties due to lack of literacy are sparsely evidenced
in developed 'Western cultures where language is the
vehicle of transmission of all types of knowledge and
practically all children are taught to read by legislative
1
2fiat. The consequences to educational policies have been
enormous. The subtle influences of the acquisition of
literacy have clouded our view of our own intellectual
development. Much psychology, because it has been for-
mulated and tested in a literate mileau, cannot differ-
entiate between cognitive skills which are products of
literacy acquisition or the schooling experience and those
which develop from chronological maturity.
Because cross-cultural experiments which may extri-
from its literate 'i/tfestern grounding are
only in the beginning stages, psychologists have not only
been hesitant to hypothesize the effects of general cul-
ture, but also the outcomes of intellectual inheritance of
cultures. At present, psychologists seem to be construct-
ing a conglomeration of likenesses before confronting
differences. The conservative approach to the interpre-
tation of existing data may be appropriate so as not to
substantiate ideas of race superiority, but differences
between Third World and Western cultures are glaring none-
theless. Anthropologists, looking into non-European cul-
tures, have suggested bold insights into the consequences
of literacy, but these insights become tangled with the
effects of technological and economic development.
This study seeks to shed light on a middle position--
that literacy does have an effect on general language com-
3prehension and that the effects are not culturally-
specific but are the same for all people, irrespective of
culture, who learn to read. The contention is that the
acquisition of literacy fosters development of cognitive
strategies for comprehending language as words and syntax.
In other words, more attention must be paid to the words
and the relationships between them when the words are
written on a page rather than when they are embedded in
a conversation rich with contextual cues for meaning. As
a person is learning to rea4 he or she develops and re-
fines strategies to deal with the language at the semantic
and syntactic level. Essentially, the strategies allow an
individual to arrive at a meaning by means of the linguis-
tic cues alone, without contextual cues. These strategies
are useful in all language comprehension— oral as well as
written
.
To contend that reading acquisition develops new
strategies in language comprehension, it is, of course,
necessary to establish that aural language comprehension is
not solely based on words and relationships between words,
but also on situational contexts. The strictly non-
literate subjects of previous studies help substantiate
the argument that language comprehension may be g reatly
assisted by contextuality . It is dominant in the beginnings
of language comprehension for children of all cultures.
4The switch from dependence on context to language
-based
semantic and syntactic cues will not occur, especially if
(1) some event (namely, learning to read) does not direct
attention specifically at the words and relationships
between words that comprise language; or (2) if the cul-
ture does not place demands on the individual to acquire
knowledge primarily through language. Neither of these
demands are typically present in rural Third World non-
literate cultures. Therefore, Third World semi-literate
subjects used in this study are ideal to demonstrate the
influence of literacy.
Significant research has been done on rural non-
literate societies and a portion of this literature is
examined. The previous research, however, studied totally
non-literate adults who had never attended school. This
study, on the other hand, used rural semi-literate adults
in a culture that is fairly literate and progressive for
a Third World country--Jamaica. It established correla-
tions between reading skill and language comprehension
skills as measured by the task of solving orally-presented
syllogisms
.
Syllogisms are word puzzles, first catalogued by
Aristotle, which require a person to make a logical
inference on information presented in a premise. As more
research is carried out with syllogisms, the critical
5role of the subjects' interpretation of the premise state-
ment is becoming more apparent. If the original premise
IS misunderstood, subjects' inferences are likely to be
invalid when judged in terms of the original premise.
The requirements of the syllogism will be examined shortly
in full.
£ZllQ^ism task res earch in the Third ';tforld
. Language com-
prehension, per se, has not been isolated in much experi-
mentation in the Third World. This is not to say that
language comprehension failures have not affected perfor-
mance in other types of problems posed to Third World non-
literates. oyllogism tasks require precise comprehension
of simple logically-connected sentences, and have been a
topic of research in experiments done both in the West
and the Third World. In Africa syllogistic testing has
been carried out in studies by psychologists Silvia Scrib-
ner, Michael Cole, John Gay, and others over a number of
years with the Kpelle and Vai tribes in Liberia. Alexander
Luria, a Russian psychologist, also used syllogisms in the
1930 's to test rural peasants in Central Asia. The goal
of these studies was to ascertain whether "logic" is
related to "culture" and whether logical thinking, easily
conceptualized as Piaget's propositional thinking stage,
was a part of normal maturation.
6A whole array of psychological tests have been given
to Third World non-literates that tested perception, memory,
classification, learning, problem-solving, and deductive
logic. Non-literate's performance on the syllogism task
has seemed to resist improvement even when the materials
were modified by using premises which depicted concrete
culturally-acceptable reality. Still, a solution rate at
chance levels or below was reported (Cole and Scribner,
1974), well below American high school students whose
solution rate on similar syllogisms was 90 percent (Scrib-
ner, 1975).
Nowhere in psychological literature have syllogisms
been an easy task for subjects, and for a number of reasons
to be examined shortly. Many researchers hold that subjects
reason well, but not necessarily on the information as
stated in the premises. They reason well on their own
understanding of a problem (Chapman and Chapman, 1959;
Henle, 1962; Relvis, 1974, 1975; Scribner, 1975; Olson,
1978 ). Evans (1971) has suggested that syllogism research
should measure both the subjects' peculiar understanding
of the premise and the reasoning as well. The evidence
suggests that failure to comprehend accurately the premise
language and not poor logical reasoning is the underlying
cause for poor performance in syllogism tasks.
7Schooling.. and literacy ac^ulsi^, it is interesting to
note that logic-like" thinking appeared in Kpelle students
who had reached the third grade level (Cole and Scribner,
1974). Schooling does have a clear-cut effect not only on
syllogism performance, but on the whole range of cogni-
tive tasks that Gay, Cole, and Scribner used.
Greenfield, Reich, and Olver ( 1966 ) speculate how
schooling brings about improvement in verbal ability.
In school children can learn and practise language in
non-contextual situations. Thus, sentences begin to carry
the meaning of the communication, and the formal organiza-
tion of language forces a student to organize personal
experience or actions in the mold of language.
Granted, it is almost impossible to separate schooling
from the acquisition of literacy--indeed
,
the raison d’etre
of formal education has been the written language
. The
insights of Greenfield et al
. , notwithstanding, children
are taught to read before children learn to "translate their
experience and actions into words that will satisfy a
teacher. (p.3l6)" It is a major contention of this study
that schooling, especially in terms of syllogism perfor-
mance, can be narrowed to the effect of the acquisition of
literacy. In essence, the acquisition of reading enables
better overall language comprehension. Better comprehension
directly improves syllogism performance because the pre-
8mises are better understood and thus reasoning is more
likely based on the premises as stated.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore relationships
between skill in reading comprehension and skill at solving
syllogisms. The wedding of two seemingly unrelated skills--
reading comprehension and performance on a syllogism task
—
first requires a theoretical rationale. The basis for
the rationale is derived from cognitive psychology--speci-
fically from studies in language comprehension and memory.
Research and observations from developmental psychology
are incorporated. Finally, literature dealing with skills
in reading comprehension is addressed. All of these are
related to cross-cultural studies in psychology.
Rural Jamaican women with up to nine years of school-
ing were asked to solve four orally-presented syllogisms.
Subjects were asked to answer the syllogism question and
justify their answer. An elaborated premise condition
(premises which had been amplified by two redundant state-
ments) was incorporated to enhance subjects’ comprehension
of the premise statement and hence their overall syllogism
performance. Various measurements were made for memory of
the premise, separate from reasoning performance. Other
instruments tried to assess the understanding of the con-
9elusion to the syllogism--irrespective of the ability to
justify verbally that conclusion. A cloze passage measured
reading comprehension.
i.he experimental relationships which the data analysis
seeks to establish include the correlations between skill
at reading comprehension and success at solving syllogisms
and the correlations between skill at reading comprehension
and memory of the premise. Additionally, differences in
performance resulting from the elaborated premise condition
are examined.
Outline of the Chapters
Correlational studies require a theoretical justifi-
cation which unites the elements. This study in parti-
cular requires extensive rationale because numerous
theoretical links are made in justifying the contention
that the acquisition of reading skill enhances language
comprehension and that accurate language comprehension
is essential to solving syllogisms. Chapter II, the
Theoretical Underpinnings, details this linkage.
Following that, a presentation of the hypotheses,
design, and experimental variables is presented in
Chapter III.
The data is presented and analyzed in two stages in
10
Chapter IV. Unexpected differences between performances of
subjects tested by the two field interviewers occurred,
oince the interpretations possible on other data analyses
are affected, these differences and other effects of
the
control or treatment condition, the grammatical form
of the
syllogism, and the order of presentation are scrutinized
first. In the light of these differences, the
interrela-
tionships between reading skill, performance on
the syllo-
gism task, and memory of the syllogism premise
are estab-
lished and analyzed.
Chapter V presents concluding remarks and
suggestions
for further study.
Limitations
This study uses simple syllogisms to
examine possible
correlations between syllogism performance
and the compon-
ents of syllogism performance-sentence
comprehension and
basic deductive reasoning—with basic
reading skills.
Stated in such a manner, these
relationships are quite
broad, however, the hypotheses in
this study are specifi-
cally limited to elementary
levels—elementary syllogisms,
elementary sentence comprehension,
elementary reading.
Simple, valid syllogisms were
used because the
straightforward relationships make
them the easi
Hence implications for higher
levels of reasoning.
solve
.
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or more difficult syllogisms, are precluded.
Not all subjects were literate, although many had a
number of years of schooling. /\fithin the spectrum of
reading skills possible, most subjects possessed only
limited reading comprehension ability. With respect to
education, the uppermost limit of the sample was confined
to women with nine years of formal schooling. Because
subjects represented a middle ground between those tested
previously in Western settings (educated and literate) and
Third World (primarily uneducated and non-literate),
specific comparisons of the results obtained in this study
are limited.
Sentence comprehension was measured by two tasks
neither of which have precedence in established psycholo-
gical methodology. Syllogism comprehension was measured
first by an unprompted oral reconstruction of the informa-
tion in the premise. Previous syllogism studies, except
for Scribner (1975) » have not focused on the specific
measurement of premise recall separate and apart from
general reasoning performance; hence there is little basis
to compare performances. Secondly, yes-no questions were
used to measure the amount of information which the subject
may have remembered though not made explicit in the
justification or the recall tasks. Yes-no questions have
never been used to measure memory of the syllogism premise;
12
moreover yes-no questions, although seemingly similar to
sentence recognition tasks, may entail other cognitive
demands (Akiyama. Brewer, and 3hoben. 1979). Hence the
results obtained from this tudy are not readily comparable
with studies in the general area of sentence recognition.
The data, as collected, lends itself only to corre-
lational analysis without indication of any causes or
effects. The rationale which might justify a causal
relationship is presented in Chapter II and discussed
again in Chapter V. Still, conclusions which are warrant-
ed by strict data analysis are support or rejection of the
positive correlational relationships between reading
skill and language comprehension and reading skill and
syllogism solving.
The data analysis is done in the shadow of Lashley’s
Dictum: only the product of internal organization is
evident--the actual processes remain conjecture. The
observables are the performance on the cloze passage
,
the skill of syllogism solving, and the proficiency of
answering yes-no questions targeted at recognition of
information in the premise. The processes of language
comprehension
,
reading skill, reasoning and memory merely
cast their shadows. An attempt at suggesting the organi-
zing processes involved is made in Chapter II in order to
present a rationale for suspected linkages between reading
13
skill acquisition, reasoning, and language comprehension.
Significance
Despite the limitations operant in this study,
several factors make it significant. This study represents
the first time (to my knowledge informed by a search of the
relevant literature) that correlations have been attempted
among reading skill, syllogism performance, and oral langu-
age comprehension in a Third World setting of semi-literate
adults. By using as subjects rural Jamaican women of
African origin this study obviated the way in which many
studies in current developmental psychology are confounded--
by interaction of processes of maturational development
with consequences of schooling and concomitant acquisi-
tion of reading skill. Cognitive development is held
constant by virtue of the chronological maturity of the
subjects; the degree of reading skill is treated as a co-
variable rather than an intervening variable.
The study uses syllogisms as a tool to investigate
language comprehension as well as performance on the
syllogism task. How well a subject justifies and later
recalls the syllogism is used as an indication of the
extent to which the syllogism was understood. Yes-no
questions were used to ascertain how the premise was
internally representated which may not have been evident
14
from the explicit recall statement. Although such method-
is in only nascent states of development, further
refinement may provide basis for data which could eluci-
date the role of language comprehension in syllogism
solving.
In terms of implications to education, this study is
significant because it argues for reconsideration of the
role of literacy acquisition in cognitive development,
especially the comprehension of language. If the data
collected supports the theoretical argument that the ac-
quisition of reading skill enhances language comprehension,
even aural comprehension, then a case can be made for
emphasis on reading instruction in elementary and secondary
education.
Jamaica
Jamaica is an island in the Caribbean, the size of
Connecticut, with a population of over two million. It
was colonized by the British in the seventeenth century
and gained its independence in 1962. Although its econo-
mic fortunes have varied since independence, (major
exports; beauxite, tourism, and sugar), Jamaica is among
the most developed island of the English-speaking Caribbean.
The official language is English; the spoken rural
language, a patois--a mixture of English words with heavy
15
influence of West African tribal language syntax of the
blacks who were brought to Jamaica as part of the rum-
molasses-slave triangular trade of the l?00's between it,
the American colonies, and Africa.
Despite the existence of patois, the standard English
prevails as the prestigious mode of communication. There
are several daily newspapers of island-wide circulation.
One newspaper, The Daily Gleaner , is noted for the high
caliber of English usage in its editorial pages. Three
radio stations broadcast throughout the entire island and
all programming is in standard English. Many of the pro-
grams on the two government-owned stations are aimed at
providing development-related information useful to rural
Jamaicans
.
Education is and has been an important priority of the
government even in colonial times. The British usually
established in their colonies excellent potable water
systems and viable educational institutions. Jamaica
boasts of a 76 percent literacy rate (UNESCO figures)
although the high figure is questioned by some, and others
believe the standard for literacy is set artificially
low--a fourth grade education.
Adult literacy has been an important government
priority. In 1972 the government created the Jamaican
Movement for the Advancement of Literacy (JAMAL) . J/IMAL
16
organizes literacy classes throughout Jamaica using volun-
teer teachers. Most of JaMAL's students are primary
school dropouts who hope to complete the course-thus
demonstrating an eighth grade reading level. JAP/IAL has
been a monstrous effort both in terms of the number of
towns with JaMAL centers established and in terms of costs,
regardless of volunteer teachers. The success of JAMaL
has been mixed, but the point is the JAMaL efforts and the
commitment to general education demonstrate the priorities
of the government and the esteem in which literacy is
held by the general public.
Considering the newspapers, the radio stations, the
educational system, and JAMAL, it can be unequivocally
asserted that Jamaica is primarily a literate culture.
Greenfield (I969) differentiates between literate cultures
and oral traditional ones. That Jamaica is a literate
culture will become more germane as the theoretical pre-
sentation unfolds.
The data collected for this study was collected during
August, 1980. Normally dates of collection are not signi-
ficant; however, Jamaica was at that time embroiled in a
violent election campaign. From January, I98O, some five
hundred politically-related killings had taken place.
Besides, having a general paranoia of strangers, people were
17
divided so sharply on political issues that social
acquaintances (especially among the lower classes) hinged
on political party affiliations.
The election campaign and the general level of anxiety,
suspicion, and violence it created affected the study in the
following ways. oelection of interviewers and choice of
areas was limited. A week after one area was chosen,
the police station was burned down by a politically-
motivated mob. It became clear that a stranger telling
even stranger stories (the syllogisms) and asking questions
about "thinking" would be viewed with distrust and appre-
hension. Of the available women interviewers, the two
whose hometowns were in rural areas were selected. These
women went to their hometowns to interview in the neighbor-
hood in which they were known. The interviews were not
recorded on audio tape as had been hoped originally.
Finally, the chief researcher was precluded from accompany-
ing the interviewers, even into the towns. There was in
Jamaica at that time an inordinate suspicion that every
American, and especially an American official, was a
member of the C.I.A. My presence would have bode ill for
the interviewers and the conduct of the study.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Cross Cultural Studies
Testing with syllogisms in cross-cultural contexts
previously has been done in two settings--on the West
Coast of Africa and in Central Asia. Cole and Scribner
( 197^ and Scribner, 1975) did extensive research with the
Kpelle and Vai tribes in Africa. These studies are exa-
mined here in some detail and then placed in a larger
context of syllogism solving. The insights derived from
the examination of syllogism research set the parameters
for the theoretical argument which ensues.
Cole and Scribner (197^) relate an experiment in
which Kpelle Village leaders were tested with orally-
presented syllogisms. After listening to the premise,
the villagers were asked to draw a conclusion and finally
to justify their answers. The following is an excerpt
of an interchange between experimenter and subject.
Experimenter: At one time, spider went to a feast.
He was told to answer this question
before he could eat any of the food.
The question is: Spider and black deer
always eat together. Spider is eating.
Is black deer eating?
Subject: Were they in the bush?
Experimenter: Yes.
18
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Subject
:
They were eating together?
Experimenter
:
Spider and black deer always eat
together. Spider is eating. Is black
deer eating?
Subject But I was not there . How can I answer
such a question?
Experimenter Can t you answer it? Even if you were
not there, you can answer the question.
(Repeats the question.)
Subject Oh, oh, black deer is eating.
Experimenter
;
What is your reason for saying that
black deer was eating?
Subject The reason is that black deer always
walks about all day eating green leaves
in the bush. Then he rests for a while
and gets up again to eat. (p. 163)
Only one third of the non-literate adults answered
the problems correctly (less than chance); of these very
few gave the correct reason for their answer. The diffi-
culty was not due to the culture or to the structure of
the language. Kpelle high school students, given the same
syllogisms, responded correctly 90 percent of the time, and
for the right reasons (Cole and Scribner, 197^)
•
The
difference in performance seemed to be due to schooling.
Further evidence indicates that the switch to logic-like
thinking began to appear in the third grade.
Luria ( 1971 ) with work done on Central Asian peasants
in the 1930 's corroborated this view and added another
dimension when he cited evidence of abilities of literate
20
and pre-literate groups to solve logical syllogisms.
^'\/hile groups could solve syllogisms based on personal
experience (Cotton grows where it is hot and humid. In
the village it is hot and humid. Does cotton grow there
or not?), only the literate group or those "who had
participated as activists in the newly-formed collective
farms" could solve successfully a syllogism beyond their
immediate experience. (In the north where there is snow
all year, the bears are white. Town X is there in the
north. Are the bears white in that town or not?). There
was either a refusal to accept the assertions made in the
premise or a hesitancy to draw a logical conclusion in
situations of little personal experience. In short, the
subject did not want to lie about what he did not know.
Every one of these types of errors-- (1) the terms
of the problem not being accepted; (2) the terms being
modified to conform to a perceived reality; or (3) addi-
tional information being brought in to justify the con-
clusion—are made by even American college students (Henle,
1962). In fact, Henle despaired about the illogic of
American college students. But compared with American
high school students on similar forms of syllogisms.
Third jVorld villagers are even less logical (Scribner,
1975 )* In the follow-up study to the one reported in Cole
21
and ^cribner (197't), Scribner (1975) presented a series
of syllogisms to American high school students, Kpelle
high school students, and Kpelle villagers. American
high school students answered correctly 90 percent of the
syllogisms; Kpelle high school students, 80 percent, and
Kpelle villagers, 53 percent ( a chance rate). The
errors made by all groups were the same general types, but
the incidence and the severity of errors are greater among
ihird World viHagGrs,
In that study, Scribner {1975) attempted to isolate
the factors which were causing such poor performance among
Ihird
.Jorld non-literates. Scribner had suspected that it
could be the subjects' inability to remember the premise.
To ascertain the remembrance of the information of the
premise. Scribner asked the Kpelle villagers to repeat
the premises at two different points in the experiment—
once after the subject had given his or her answer and then
again after the experimenter had read the premise again
very slowly. Her findings confirmed her suspicion. Two
examples of interchanges follow;
Problem; The chief's brother either gave him a
goat or he gave him a chicken. The
chief's brother did not give him a
Goat. Did he give him a chicken?
subject s answer and reason: Yes, I know he gave it
to him.
22
Subject's first recall: The chief's brother will givehim a pat. If he does not give him a goathe will give him a chicken.
Experimenter: What question did I ask?
subject: You asked me, is the chief's brother
going to give him a goat?
Experimenter: (Reads the problem again).
Subject's second recall: Yes. That is what you told
me. ?he chief's brother will give him
a goat. If he does not give him a
goat, he will give him a chicken.
Experimenter: What question did I ask you?
Subject: You asked me, the chief's brother will
give him a goat. If he does not give
him a goat, will he give him a chicken?
(Cole and Scribner, 1974
, p.165).
ilnd a second example:
Problem: Some kwi (Western) people are wealthy.
All wealthy people are powerful. Are
some kwi people powerful?
Subject s answer and reason: Yes, it is because some
kwi are wealthy and they have power.
Subject's first recall: Some kwi in this town are
wealthy. Chey have power.
Experimenter: What question did I ask you?
Subject: Do some kwi have power?
Experimenter: (Repeats the problem)
Subject's second recall: Some kwi are wealthy. They
have power. Do many wealthy people
have power? (Cole and Scribner,
1974, pp. 165-166)
The subjects' recall showed no improvement over the
first. Never once did either subject recall the premise
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making explicit the elements and their relationships.
Before progressing with a direct investigation of
possible causes for poor performance of rural Third World
villagers, some background in syllogism research done in
developed cultures will provide a better understanding
with which to view the performance of non-literate peoples
on these tasks. First the form of a syllogism and its
requirements are presented. Then several theories explain-
ing syllogism performance are examined. In investigating
syllogism performance, it is important to keep in mind
that deductive reasoning is not limited to the nature of
the literate. Examples of deductive reasoning in five and
six year olds will be presented. The crux of all of the
documented difficulties people of all cultures have with
the syllogism does not seem to be reasoning, per se,
but understanding the exact constraints of the premise,
and correctly representing the terms of the problem. Not
deficient reasoning but inadequate language comprehension
seems to account for poor performance. Finally, the
especially poor performance on syllogisms by non-literate
Third World people is explained by linking the disabling
effects of inadequate comprehension of the premise with
the absence of comprehension skills acquired in the compre-
hension of reading.
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Syllogisms
Syllogisms are deductive word puzzles in which all
information necessary for the conclusion is incorporated
in the premise. There are several types of syllogisms:
the propositional syllogism (if . . . then.
.
. )
,
the three-term
syllogism or linear syllogism (a is larger than B, and B
is larger than C), and the class-inclusion syllogism (also
called classical or categorical syllogisms). Class-
inclusion syllogisms are the type used in this and other
Third i/Vorld studies. They are of the general form:
Major premise: Precious metals do not rust.
iMinor premise: Gold is a precious metal
Conclusion: (Gold does not rust.)
Typically, the information in the premise is not
redundant. The necessary relationships are established
only once. Two discreet elements (a subject term and a
predicate term) are united by a common third, called the
middle term. It is by uniting the subject term with the
middle term and a predicate term to the middle term that
the relationship between the first and the third is apparent.
In the example above, "precious metals" is the middle
term.
The syllogism requires the solver to assemble the
elements of the premise within their given relationships
and then, realizing that one relationship is implicit,
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to generate it so that the new relationship is consistent
with the constraints of pre-ordained relationships# (A
task variation supplies a premise question-- "Does gold
rust? "--which does not require the subject to establish
the new relationship, rather to confirm it. ?he premise
0
question lessens the difficulty because it eliminates
having to work out all alternative relationships.)
The task of the subject is to understand the premise
and then draw the conclusion. Except in instances when
the premise depicts truthful statements regarding familiar
objects (and conclusions follow from real life as well
as the terms of the problem) memory for the terms of the
premise as stated is essential. Scribner's results
pinpointed the difficulties Third World peoples have with
syllogisms begin with the memory of the premise statement.
Of course, if the terms are not accepted, the task of the
syllogism is terminated. And some syllogisms require the
subject to suspend disbelief. Scribner showed that even
when the task is not rejected, inadequate memory of the
premise statement is a substantial deterrent to success.
Evans (1972) suggested that measuring the subject’s
interpretation of the premise should be included in the
methodology of any study of syllogisms. Unfortunately,
no tasks have been devised to fathom the subject's under-
standing of the premise independent of direct recall.
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In recent years, three conceptualizations of syllo-
gistic reasoning have been proposed--the Atmosphere Hypo-
thesis, the Conversion Hypothesis, and an unnamed hypo-
thesis (proposed by Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978). The
Atmosphere Hypothesis (Woodworth and Sells, 1935 ; Begg
and Denny I969 ) and the hypothesis proposed by Johnson-
Laird and Steedman have evolved primarily from experi-
ments using invalid syllogisms (syllogisms which cannot
be solved because there is no single correct answer).
Consequently these hypotheses of syllogistic behavior
explain better why people cannot reason rather than why
they can. On the other hand, the Conversion Hypothesis
(Chapman and Chapman, 1959; Ceraso and Provitera, 1971 )
was based on work done with both valid and invalid syllo-
gisms. Since all research done in the Third World on
syllogism tasks has used valid syllogisms, the Conversion
Hypothesis is the best suited as the theoretical framework
for this study.
The Conversion Hypothesis states that people do,
in fact, reason logically albeit errors are made in
syllogism tasks. The errors result primarily from the
subject's misinterpreting the premises; however, granting
these misinterpretations, logical performance is generally
acceptable. Unsolvable invalid syllogisms become solvable
if the subject limits his subjective interpretation of
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the premise to one particular meaning. For example,
multiple and ambiguous meanings of the word "some" seem
to be the source of many technical errors, but if the
subject "converts" the meaning of "some" to a single
definition, the relationships within the syllogism pre-
mise are clear and the syllogism is solvable. Errors in
reasoning on the premise-as-stated are traceable to sub-
jective interpretation of the premise and not to faulty
reasoning.
Of the three hypotheses explaining syllogism perfor-
mance, the Conversion Hypothesis best accounts for the
range of human cognition which is brought to bear in a
syllogism-solving task. It is not based on the assumption
that the subject understands all possible interpretations
of the premise. Other studies (Henle, 1962; Evans, 19?2;
bcribner, 1975 ) have shown that the subject's interpreta-
tion of the premise is often not the equivalent of the
premise-as-stated. The Conversion Hypothesis is the best
explanation describing how people do reason rather than
why they do not.
The Conversion Hypothesis is consistent with studies
showing that inference is a by-product of the comprehen-
sion process. The landmark article by Bransford, Barclay,
and Franks (1972) shows that people, in a recognition
task, cannot distinguish actually heard sentences from new
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sentences containing invited inference they may have made
in the course of comprehending those sentences. For
example, subjects identified the sentence "Three turtles
rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath it"
for the original sentence, "Three turtles rested on a
floating log and a fish swam beneath them . " Subjects,
however, demurred identifying the sentence, "Three turtles
rested beside a floating log and a fish swam beneath it."
for "Three turtles rested beside a floating log and a
fish swam beneath them." Other studies (Johnson. Bransford,
Solomon, 1973! Kintsch, and Keenman, 197'J-) have corrobrated
the view that constructive inference is a part of extract-
ing meaning from a sentence. Memory is greater than the
sum of its inputs.
Other inferences are made in language comprehension
in the form of presuppositions. Haviland and Clark (1974)
demonstrated that the presupposition in a statement such
as "Frank has stopped beating his wife" is fathomed and
remembered
.
Nothing is arcane about deductive reasoning. Logi-
cians with their truth-tables and Venn diagrams of sets
and sub-sets have catapulted deductive thinking into areas
generally reserved for high cognitive abstractions;
actually deductive reasoning based on internally conceived
premises of the way-things-are-in-the-world is child's
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play. Donaldson (1978) demonstrated evidence of five and
six year olds' deductive thinking by parsing comments
made while listening to stories.
..hat a lot of things he's taking! He wouldn'thave... he s only
^
got two hands and he wouldn't
things^^^^
hands to carry all these
(Premises: 1. Peter has more to carry than
can carry; 2. Peter has only two hands.Conclusion:
_ It is not possible for Peter to carry
all that he is represented as carrying. Implied
criticism of the story.)
^3he must have eaten all her food on the other day."(Premises: 1. Houses normally have food inthem; 2. This house has no food. Conclusion: Thefood must have been all eaten up.)
But how can it be (that they are getting married)?lou have to have a man too." (The book contains anillustration of a wedding in which the man looks
rather like a woman. The child thinks it is a picture
of two women.)
(Premises: 1. You need a man for a wedding;
2. There is no man in the picture. Conclusion: It
can't be a wedding.) (p.52)
Deductive thinking is not the apex of cognitive per-
formance that some .Vestern psychologists may have supposed.
That notion was based on the observed difficulty in reason-
ing under experimental situations and unfortunately pri-
marily on invalid syllogisms which could not be solved.
Rather, deductive inference is part of the natural compre-
hensional process which reflects, in Donaldson's words,
"a fundamental human urge to make sense of the world"
(1978, p.ll6).
Just because these studies have been centered pri-
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manly in the .Vest is no reason to assume that spontaneous
inference is not an intellectual gift of all peoples. Cole
and Scribner (19?4) give evidence that reasoning in non-
literate cultures done on the premise as reinterpreted is
valid reasoning. Syllogism premises which described
social situations in the Kpelle village were typical of
valid reasoning done on reinterpreted premises. Villagers
would simply reject some of the given premises and add
additional ones to arrive at a conclusion which expressed
some "social truth":
Experimenter; If Flumo or Yakpalo drinks cane juice
the town chief gets vexed. Flumo is
not drinking cane juice. Yakpalo is
drinking cane juice. Is the town
chief vexed?
Subject
:
People do not get vexed with two
persons
.
Experimenter; (Repeats the problem)
Subject; The town chief was not vexed on that
day.
Experimenter; The town chief was not vexed? 'yVhat is
the reason?
Subject; The reason is he doesn't love Flumo.
Experimenter; He doesn’t love Flumo? Go on with the
reason.
Subject; The reason is that Flumo 's drinking is
a hard time . That is why when he drinks
cane juice, the town chief gets vexed.
But sometimes when Yakpalo drinks cane
juice, he will not give a hard time
to people. He goes to lie down to sleep.
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At that rate people do not get
vexed with him. But people who drink
and go about fighting— the town chief
cannot love them in the town. (p.163)
'/Jith respect to the original premises, the conclusion
was wrong, but in the framework of the subject, the con-
clusion was logical Cole and Scribner parse
:
Flumo's drinking gives people a hard time.
(Explicit premise)
Yakpalo's drinking does not give people a hard time.
(Explicit premise)
People do not get vexed when they are not given a
hard time.
( Explicit premise)
The town chief *is a person.
(Implicit premise)
Therefore, the town chief is not vexed at Yakpalo.
(Conclusion) (p. 163 )
The villagers' performance cited above may stretch
the behavioral descriptions of the Conversion Hypothesis
as conceptualized by Chapman and Chapman, but the quint-
essence of the explanation holds: the subject interprets
the syllogism premise in subjective terms and reasons on
the problem framed in that manner. Successful reasoning on
converted premises was most evident when reasoning about
a familiar social situation for which some available
social truths could be applied. In other studies in
which social expectations were not so readily applicable
(e.g. Scribner, 1975) » misunderstanding (for example, mix-
ing the terms of the premise in the recall) was more domin-
ant. This type of performance is explained readily by the
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Conversion Hypothesis. Blatently fictional topics, such
as the eating habits of deer and black spiders, were
simply not accepted.
Although outright rejection of the terms of the pro-
blem IS not a part of conversion, lack of comprehension
of the premise could, in fact, explain in part why some
Third
.Vorld subjects balk at the task. The refusal may
indicate that no sense could be made of the premise at
all. The requisite knowledge for the solution is incom-
plete or non-existent. This explains Luria’s reports of
the peasants refusing to "lie” (1971) or Cole and Scrib-
ner s observation that ancillary evidence was often brought
to bear in the justification of the answer (1974). Given
the incomplete knowledge base from which to infer the
answer, the most honest answer available is for a subject
to refuse to answer or to justify answers in terms of
knowledge of the actual physical world.
i.vidence for the Conversion Hypothesis is found in
both Western and Third Worlds. The challenge to the re-
searcher is to discover causes of premise misinterpreta-
tion and misunderstanding. The most fertile ground for
investigation could well be among the non-literate or
barely literate because whatever the causes are, as
Scribner (1975) points out, the incidence and severity of
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errors in syllogism performance are more pronomiced in
Third 'J\/orld subjects.
I have broadened the term "conversion" to denote the
degree of difference between the original premise present-
ed and the subject's restatement of it. The concept applies
equally well to sentence comprehension. A target sen-
tence undergoes conversion when a subject recalls it in
such a way that the meaning of the sentence presented is
altered in its semantic intent. For the purposes of this
study, recalling an original sentence "It was the truck
that hit the car" as "The car was hit by the truck" is
not conversion. The semantic intent remains intact,
although the syntactic embodiment of the sentence is al-
tered significantly.
Conversion is a concept of degrees as recall attempts
vary in the amount of integrity of the meaning preserved.
Examples from actual recalls of the syllogism premises
of this study would be instructive. "All red-bellied
spiders live in mango trees" was converted by one subject
to "Only red-oellied spiders live in mango trees." Another
subject converted the sentence to a more severe degree:
"Red-bellied them don't live in mango trees."
The ensuing sections first establish a conceptual
basis for language comprehension--contextual and linguistical
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cues are examined for their role in comprehension.
Beginning language comprehension in children is shown to
be primarily contextual in nature. Greater reliance on
linguistic cues chiefly occurs later and is primarily due
to the beginnings of literacy skills. Finally, conver-
sions in premise comprehension are examined against the
background of the influence of literacy on language com-
prehension in general.
Input for Language Comprehension
The following section presents a logical consider-
ation of the types of input available to the brain in
language comprehension. The section is neither a review
of the literature of language comprehension nor a precise
description of the cognitive processes which may be
actively involved in language processing. Ultimately the
presentation results in a conceptual framework in which
cognitive strategies involved in language comprehension
may be understood.
Speech contains two systems or families of cues:
contextual and linguistic. Contextual cues include the
prosody, gesticulation, volume, and speed variations of
the speaker, also, when the substance of the message is
something which is directly observable, the immediate
environment provides contextual cues. Non-verbal communi-
cation is included in the context as well.
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Linguistic cues are the words and their syntax in
the message itself, devoid of contextual cues. These cues
are the semantic and syntactic elements of the language.
Cognitive Strategies
In order for the brain to take advantage of any cue,
whether language-related or perceptual, the cue must be
detected and analyzed for its inherent information which
contributes to the perception of meaning. This process of
analysis, an interaction of the cognitive mechanisms of
attention, memory and ones view-of-the-world
,
is a
cognitive strategy . " The notion of a cognitive strategy
is a fictional convenience. Obviously there are processes
in the brain that enable the person to take
advantage of the contextual and linguistic cues--these
attention-memory interactions are aggregated as "cognitive
strategies .
"
In the following pages the general character of cogni-
tive strategies is considered. Inherent within the dis-
cussion of cognitive strategies is consideration of the
organization of memory; an organization which affects the
nature of the cognitive strategies, and v/hich is in turn
may be refined or altered as a result of new cognitive
inputs
.
Cognitive strategies are best conceived in a context
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of overall memory processes. Under the direction of
memory, cognitive strategies analyze and organize detected
information in a manner that is compatible with other
usually highly organized information already stored in the
brain. In other words, strategies not only accrue sen-
sory information for the purpose of comprehension, but
they are also responsible for its processing—analysis and
organization--so that the input may be stored in the memory
as "knowledge."
Some cognitive strategies and consequent organization
of sensory information may be innate, but others are
learned. Another word for an innate wired-in strategy is
"instinct," and in human beings, instincts are few. A great
many strategies are learned through interaction with the
environment. Linguistic strategies, for example, accrue
as a function of the amount and quality of an individual’s
comprehension of language. The contextual situation, the
complexity of cuing systems, the tolerance for variations
from precise interpretations all make up the quality of
the encounter. (This theme will recur in the "Processes
of Language Acquisition.")
Cognitive strategies are keyed to the cuing systems
but the correspondence is not necessarily one-to-one.
an individual may not have strategies for every conceivable
cue in a system. It is possible that the individual per-
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forms adequately without access to a particular cue or
that a strategy has not yet been developed.
It follows that the more cues that are available to
a person, the greater the possible breadth of the informa-
tion base from which to build comprehension. People with
a large arsenal of varied strategies stand a better chance
of making meaning of any message than those with limited
strategies. The process is developmental: as strategies
accrue, greater use of a cuing system as the basis for
comprehension is possible. In summary, as the number of
the strategies increase through the practice of comprehend-
ing language, the more useful the cuing systems become for
language comprehension.
The Organization of Memory
The components of memory are organized even at its
very finest gradations representing the make-up of
features. Language input and all sensory inputs in gen-
eral are interpreted and stored in the brain in a syn-
thesized code (Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield, 1979).
The code transforms the input into a uniform system which
allows for comparisons with other inputs; constructions
of the original input which adhere to the semantic and
grammatical constraints of language.
Organization need not be restricted to simply internal
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sensory codes. Subjects asked to "organize" lists of words
showed equal recall performance as subjects asked to
"learn" the same material (Mandler, 196?). Of course
people always organize to recall information--whether on
experimental lists of nonsense syllables or on one for
groceries. ifeemonic techniques offer a structured frame-
work which can subsume the to-be-remembered information.
Miller, Galantner, and Pribram's "One is a bun, two is a
shoe, three is a tree..." (1964) provide the structure;
what is left to the inventiveness of the memorizer are the
connections at each point.
Memory seems to be organized throughout the system.
Theories of propositional networks, for example Kintsch
(197^)# are useful in conceptualizing overall cognitive
organization inherent in linguistic comprehension. A
rule-governed framework, not unlike the constraints placed
on language by syntax, constitutes the basis of the
propositional network's organization.
Organization in the grandest terms is the basis for
Schank and Ableson's "scripts" (1977) or Rummelhart's
"story grammars" (1975)* The organizing guidelines are
the life experiences of each individual, and how the
individual conceptualizes them.
Information which cannot fit into the already exist-
ing organizational structures runs a considerable risk of
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"falling on deaf ears.” If, in listening to a foreign
language, for example, nothing can be organized, then
nothing is remembered. The unorganizable material and the
lack of sufficient strategies for dealing with the sit-
uation blocks meaning-making efforts.
another example, less extreme than listening to a
foreign language, may be instructive. Jamaican Peace
Corps Volunteers told a story of a community meeting in
which government rural development workers carefully
and repeatedly explained a recently set-up housing trust
to sugar cane workers. Later, when the villagers were
confronted with their monthly payments and other invidious
impositions of government bureaucracy, they swore that
these were no part of any of the explanation they had
ever received. No one had been remiss; simply, the vill-
agers’ memories were not organized to include the intri-
cacies of a housing trust. During the introductory meeting
all of the explanation which did not fit into already
established memory organization fell by the wayside.
The ability to remember information is only as good as the
memory's inherent organization.
Acquisition Period for Language Comprehension
The learned nature of the strategies for language
comprehension was brought out in the previous section.
4o
Because the child is not born speaking, the strategies
used for language production must be learned. Strategies
for language production go through predictable stages
manifested in "baby talk, " though the specific content
for each stage varies from child to child (Bloom, 1974).
Controlled experiments, reviewed shortly, indicate that
sophistication in comprehension increases as well; how-
ever, these are not so easily observable as the "baby talk"
in the earlier stages. The development of comprehension and
production skills indicate an acquisition period for lang-
uage
.
(The focus of this study is language comprehension,
not production, but the concept of an acquisition period
applies to both.)
The acquisition period is the time required to develop
strategies to deal with language input. The mastery
finally developed is what is required to allow an in-
dividual to act upon the linguistically-imbedded informa-
tion; the extent of mastery is defined by the task re-
quirements (for example, understanding instructions), or
the expectation of the message sender (the intent of the
speaker), or the cultural demands (how one is expected
to act on information) . Once an adequate comprehension
is attained, the acquisition of strategies tapers off be-
cause additional strategies, which could conceivably allow
more precise understanding, are not really demanded by the
4i
communication situation. New strategies are simply
not necessary. The argument that sufficiency arrests
the drive for perfect comprehension may add an unexpected
philosophical twist. However, few adults sharpen mathe-
matics skills simply for self-actualization. They do so
for reasons of self-interest. The point that sufficiency
defines the upper limits for the acquisition of language
comprehension skills will not be belabored.
acquisition periods may be typical of all communi-
cation mediums. Please note "mediums,” as used in this
context is pluralized by the addition of an "s" rather than
changing to the Latin root plural form "media", r.iedia in
common parlance denotes radio, television, and the like.
Medium, as the term is used here, refers to language,
mathematics, units of time, scores of music--symbol sys-
tems constructed by human beings to denote or measure
some other reality. Each medium is comprised of elements
and rules which determine the relationship between the
elements. In language, the words themselves are the
elements which are bound together in orderly relation-
ships by the syntax.
The medium itself has properties which can prolong
the acquisition period. The number of elements or the
complexity of relationships which bind the elements may
lengthen acquisition periods considerably as the numbers
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increase. On the other hand, redundancy among the ele-
ments or types of relationships mitigate the effects of
the sheer magnitude of elements and relationships.
Language, in particular, is blessed with both--a complexity
which allows articulation of almost any meaning along with
a sufficient redundancy which provides an individual a
basis to predict letters, words, or even meanings as a
strategy for comprehension (Smith, 1975).
The actual numbers of elements and relationships
sufficient for communication are determined by the com-
plexity of the particular message and the cultural demands
of the communication context. These are the identical
factors which determined the length of the acquisition
period. In fact, all are interrelated. Even though
additional elements and rules may be available in a
theoretical sense, a particular situation or a general
cultural mileau may not demand their use, hence their
acquisition is unnecessary. Vocabulary and syntactical
relationships that are considered unnecessary or irrelevant
are not likely to be acquired.
Another factor peculiar to language comprehension
which alters considerably the amount or degree of acquisi-
tion is the interaction of the two cuing systems; con-
textual cues and linguistic cues. Neither cuing system
is exclusive in the process of aural comprehension.
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Rather the two are complimentary. ^Jepending on the situa-
tion, the contributions of the two cuing systems toward
comprehension may not be equal. In face-to-face situations
context may have more influence; when reading the written
word or listening to a lecture, contextual cues, aside
from those embedded in the passage, play almost no role.
To illustrate the effects of context consider the
plight of an artist. To depict an eye, alone and out of
context, the artist must supply considerably greater detail
than were a full face depicted. With a circle for a face
and lines for noses, mouths and ears, then a dot or a
line for an eye would suffice. As the amount of contextual
evidence increases, the need for perceptual detail di-
minishes. Likewise, with language, contextual cues,
along with the shared knowledge of those involved in the
communication, provide much of the information necessary
to arrive at the meaning of an utterance. If a listener is
unable to infer from contextual cues or does not "know"
what a speaker is talking about, then the resources for
meaning are primarily linguistic in origin.
Contextual cues are a convenient short-cut to meaning
both at the stage of the very beginnings of language com-
prehension and as an individual progresses through the
acquisition period. The following section presents a brief
overview of the evolution an individual's dependence on
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contextual cues and linguistic cues.
Processes of Language Acquisition
At the very beginnings of language comprehension,
context is the singular cuing system for an infant to
arrive at meaning. Foss and Hakes (1978) point out that
adult verbal interactions with children are primarily
directed at the immediate situation thus affording the
child ample contextual basis for their interpretations.
Macnamara (1972) puts it aptly: "Infants use meaning as
a clue to language rather than language as a clue to
meaning." Donaldson (1978) adds eloquently: "In the early
stages ... language is embedded. . .in the flow of events
which accompany it. So long as this is the case, the
child does not interpret words in isolation--he interprets
situations." The task of the child is to uncover thd
relationship between the words spoken and the meaning
intended by the speaker as mediated by the child's under-
standing of the environmental situation in question. The
child does this to learn to speak, and not, as Donaldson
admonished, because the child's comprehension of adult's
communication with him or her is inadequate. Simply to
listen and to understand in broad terms what is being
said to him or her, the child could operate comfortably
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with little linguistic knowledge.
Contextual cues take precedence in beginning compre-
hension. As the child presses to learn to speak, he or
she must link up the features of the utterance with the
meaning inherent in the situation. These efforts provide
the basis for the development of semantic and syntactic
cues. Semantic strategies seem to be the ones developed
first. Two-and-a-half to three year olds seem to listen
primarily to singular words and from the meanings of
selected, individual words interpret the meaning of the
utterance, structural implications are beyond them.
Stronner and Nelson (197^) asked two to five year old
children to move dolls to enact improbable statements
such as "The mouse chased the alligator" as well as its
more probable opposite. Three year olds interpreted
both sentences on the basis of real-world probabilities--
alligators chase mice. Improbable passive sentences were
misunderstood as often as improbable active sentences.
Syntactical structures were ignored as the children appear-
ed to listen for "important" nouns and verbs and assemble
them in some meaningful, though self-ordered relationship.
This is called the "search-for-meaning" strategy.
"Search-for-meaning" has a life-long resilience.
Maxwell (1973) reports that the strategy used in skim-
ming reading material is identical. The purpose in skim-
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raing, of course, is not detailed comprehension, so a
rapid, undifferentiating strategy is adequate.
By virtue of my personal foreign language experience.
I can attest to searoh-for-meaning's usefulness in situa-
tions where the level of language spoken was beyond ray
comprehension. In Thailand, when I was thrown into situa-
tions where discussions were on treatment of Cambodian
refugees by Thai authorities, I found myself listening
for familiar nouns, verbs, and function words and imagining
as best I could the ways in which they were related. Then
I would listen with "all ears" to confirm the meaning I had
arrived at. My knowledge and skills in Thai were insuffi-
cient and the best, and possibly only, strategy avail-
able was search-for-meaning.
In children, the first inkling of the emergence of
syntactic strategies is attending to canonical word order.
A three-and-a-half year old performs at a level worse-than-
chance when acting out the words on concrete passive
sentences (Sever, 1970). Sever hypothesizes that the three-
and-a-half year olds are working on the assumption that
all sentences are formed with subject-verb-object word
order. These children are not yet attentive to cues of
the function words "by" or "is" with the past participle
which marks the passive intent. Two year olds are apparent-
ly oblivious to word order and function words because their
4?
performance is at a chance level--"superior
" to the three-
and-a-half year olds only because no emerging syntactic
strategies confounded the results. Performance improves
after three-and-a-half
, indicating the cues in function
words are acquiring greater importance.
The child proceeds from those simplest of strategies
to accumulate a broader arsenal applicable to various
types of communication situations. Slobin (1973) described
strategies which pertain to syntactic structures and their
order of occurrence. But even as these syntactic strate-
gies appear, a child may resort to context for meaning.
Adams (1977) suggests that the "child probably needs
relatively little syntactic sophistication to understand
most of what is said to him. " The child is guided by
context and stress patterns of the speaker in making his
interpretation
.
Donaldson (1979) provides a striking description of
children's responses being guided by a situation and not
by the verbal questions being asked. The task was Piaget's
conservations, but alterations in methodology made it
clear that in Piaget's typical experimental protocols,
children were mesmerized by visual information and were
not even listening to questions which they were capable
of understanding and answering. The questions children
were "hearing" were not questions about "more" or "less"
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but about the outstanding perceptual features. As
shown in other task variations, the child was aware that
some aspects of physical reality had remained constant,
but from the child s point of view, the experimenter should
be asking about what had changed and not some minor un-
altered detail-after all, it was the experimenter himself
who made the change. When some outside intruder, a
naughty teddy bear doll (not the experimenter), messed
up the order of the blocks in a conservation-of-numbers
task, the child was no longer stumped about whether equal
numbers of blocks were left present.
The child is "listening" to the context not to the
words. Carey (1976) provides more experimental evidence of
this type of listening. She partially filled a glass
with water and, leaving the pitcher on the table, asked
children to make it so there was more water in the glass,
or so that there was less, or so that there was a non-
sensical condition called "tiv." Before carrying out the
instructions, children who knew the meaning of "more"
and "less" queried the experimenter about the meaning of
"tiv" before acting. Children who did not ask, did
straightaway what they would have done regardless of
the instructions--filled the glass with more water.
Filling the glass was their all-purpose response to re-
quests for "more" water or "less" water or "tiv." The
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children were led astray by what they could see.
The point of these illustrations is not that children
are oblivious to language. They do listen. Experi-
ments carried on by Donaldson’s colleagues, (reported in
Donaldson, 1978) showed that the inclusion of one word,
an adjective, dramatically increased children's success
on tasks of classification. The miscomprehension evident
in the former experiments make it clear that contextual
expectation was playing a large role in shaping compre-
hension. That language was not the sole basis for the
interpretation, even though variations in the methodo-
losy demonstrate language itself could have been adequate,
is perhaps, as Donaldson suggests, an indication that the
child does not have sufficient confidence in his or her
language abilities. If contrary contextual evidence
appears, attention to linguistic cues is diminished.
Throughout beginning language comprehension, it is
likely that the development of semantically cued compre-
hension precedes the development of syntactically-cued
comprehension. In the very beginning, children do not
need to base meaning on the words spoken to them; rather
children base their meaning primarily on the context.
AS real world referents become attached to words, the
words take on meaning and the word's linguistic relation-
ships to other words are judged in terms of context.
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Finally, once the intent of an utterance is clear, then
the syntactical cues available may play a more important
role in language comprehension and subsequent production.
Huggins (1977) gives the role of semantics overriding
importance in language comprehension. As observable in
instances of skimming or foreign language comprehension-
primary reliance on semantic intent may be prevalent
throughout life.
Huggins (1977) continues by stating that children's
ability to deal with syntactic complexity increases with
age. The upper chronological boundary of acquisition
of syntactic strategies is well beyond the five years
that ^mith (1971) concluded was sufficient to call the
child fluent." C. Chomsky (I969 ) was the first to show
that comprehension of syntactical structures continues
well past early childhood. Lesgold ( 1974 ) used fourth
graders as subjects in comprehension tests of syntactical
structures and documented instances in which children fail-
ed to understand a construction in one context which they
could understand in another. Palmero and f/Iolfese (I972 )
argued that it is not until a child is thirteen years
old that gains in ability to understand syntactic structures
begin to taper off. In fact, Kramer, Koff, and Luria
( 1972 ) found that even some adults do not correctly
understand infrequent ask-constructions ("Prank asked Mary
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where the movie was playing.") This discovery not only
reveals the possibility for life-long development of
syntactic strategies for comprehension, but also sub-
stantiates the earlier contention that if a particular
structure is not germane to a life style and overall
linguistic environment, a concomitant strategy for com-
prehension need not be developed.
Huggin's statement that the ability to deal with syn-
tactic complexity increases with age (I977) however,
strikes a sour note. Certainly enough studies were cited
to support the claim. Left unstated is a possibly un-
warranted conclusion--that age may be a direct covariate
with the ability to deal with syntactical complexity.
The correlation is undeniably true but its directness is
specious. Ability to deal with syntactical complexity
correlates more specifically with the quality and quantity
of the individual’s use of language as a communication
medium; use of language accrues with age. Age and ability
to deal with syntactical complexity do correlate, but only
coincidentally
.
Language comprehension is not likely to develop
uniformly across cultures because great discrepancies
may exist between the amount and quality of an individual's
use of language. In fact, rural non-Western societies,
especially non-literate ones, rely very little on
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language to hand down the traditional skills of the
culture {Gay and Cole. 1967, Greenfield, 1972). Non-
literate cultures are called •'oral” because the mythology
and folklore can only be preserved by passing down the
spoken word; on the other hand education in cultural
traditions is done primarily through demonstration. Oral
societies do not rely on the linguistic medium to pass
on practical knowledge. It can only be a matter of specu-
lation how faithfully the mythology is preserved in the re-
tellings
.
In non-literate cultures context may never lose its
original primary role in comprehension. Greenfield (1972)
makes a strong case for the role of context in the speech
of Africans. Speakers in oral cultures rely heavily on
context as a basis for their thinking and communication.
The environmental context not only defines the nature of
the topic, but the speakers assumption of a common point
of view with the listener further limits the topic and
frees both listener and speaker from strict interpretation
of the meaning based on words.
Indirect evidence of "contextual listening" comes from
reports of Third World villagers dealing with Piaget’s con-
servation tasks, Fuglesang (1973) describes African
villagers
'
performance on conservation tasks which are
strikingly similar to Western children’s. If Donaldson
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(1978) IS right in her contention, children's problems
in conservation tasks are due to faulty-contextual listen-
ing. That the same faulty listening could be at the root
difficulties as well is demonstrated in a
story related by Gay and Cole (196?) . Kpelle villagers,
who could not conserve, were significantly better than
Peace Corps volunteers at estimating the volume (in mea-
sures) of piles of grain. Their difficulties with the
conservation tasks had to be linguistically-based, or else
they would not have done so well in the straightforward
task. Clearly, their difficulty sprang from the identical
source as young children's difficulty-- a normally adequate
contextual language comprehension was thwarted by the
experimental condition.
I suggest that a Third ‘y\/orld villager raised in an
oral culture in which all communication is aided by con-
text, has considerably less need for linguistically-based
comprehension strategies than his Western counterpart. I
am not contending that no linguistically-based strategies
exist, only that they are not refined. Some linguistically-
based strategies must exist or else the villagers would
grow up mute and dumb. But the refinement necessary for
communication within the confines of a more or less
immediate context or within the boundaries of a shared
knowledge is nowhere as great as refinement needed to
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understand non-contextual information, with little else
than linguistic cues to rely on.
Furthermore. I suggest that there is an occurrence
in the life of a Western child which provides the parti-
cular quality of the practice necessary. The child is con-
fronted with language containing a minimum of external
cues. The absence of context creates a dilemma in the
choice between possible meanings because that choice must
be based on language cues alone. Having to deal with a
language stripped of outside context requires the develop-
ment and refinement of strategies targeted to semantic and
syntactic cues. Thus the individual has the unique opportu-
nity to separate the words that have been used from the
situation about which the words have been used. That
encounter with language, available to the Western child as
a part of his or her developmental process, is the encounter
with literacy.
The Role of Reading
A brief review of the differences between the require-
ments of the written word and the spoken word will set
the stage for an important point: the written word dimin-
ishes the availability of contextual cues and to compensate,
during the acquisition of reading skills, refined linguistic
strategies are developed. The analysis will focus on the
55
special cognitive requirements and unique opportunities
offered by the printed word. Comprehension of the spoken
word will be contrasted when appropriate. Two areas of
contrast are especially important--the physical nature of
writing and speech and the differences in the situation
in which they are used. The subsequent analyses follow
Schallert, Kleiman, and Rubin (1977).
Thephysical nature
. The permanence of the written word
is of great convenience to the reader. The written word
allows the reader the choice of the pace at which new
material is to be comprehended (reading rates vary signi-
ficantly with difficulty of material) and control over the
amount of detail useful for the purposes of understanding
the material
.
another advantage is that the written word is per-
manent on the page, not ephemeral when spoken. A reader may
reread single words or portions of passages which were
not immediately clear and the reader is permitted to linger
over them until they are understood. Re-reading has other
ramifications
:
prediction of the content of upcoming text
(ranging from a word-to-word prediction to predictions
for concepts and outcomes) is not unaffordably risky to
overall comprehension. dhould a prediction miss the mark,
a reader may retrace words or the story line or the argu-
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ment until the misconception is rectified. On the other
hand, prediction, when it is successful, greatly reduces
the cognitive burden of analyzing every cue or set of
cues available in the passage. In fact, it is quite
plausible that a good reader can ignore many cues at a
graphemic, lexical, or even syntactic level (Smith, 1971).
It is becoming clear to psychologists studying reading
that comprehension of the written word fosters two skills
which are not linguistic in nature, but bear directly on
the quality of the comprehension processes. In .order to
determine when rereading is required, the quality of the
comprehension of the text must be continuously monitored .
In other words, a reader must be attuned to his or her
own possible miscomprehension—when the reader's expecta-
tions and actual input begin to diverge. Furthermore, some
evaluation of the reading material is necessary in terms
of its importance so that the material may be read with
appropriate care. Schallert et al (1977) in their review,
note little is known about the mechanisms of monitoring
or evaluation or how these skills develop.
On the other hand, oral stress and cadence along
with the predominately face-to-face context of speech
give it several advantages over the written word. Prosody,
stress, gesticulation, provide a wealth of cues which can
separate spoken phrases into manageable comprehension
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units. Gestures to the immediate environment can quite
literally point out the topic and main points of the con-
versation.
.^challert, et al., note that for a reader to overcome
the innate disadvantage of lack of prosody and gesticu-
lation, he or she must make greater use of syntactical
cues to divide a word string into meaningful phrases and
to isolate important points. From linguistic cues alone,
the reader must carve out the phrases within which re-
lationships are meaningful (such as an adjective to a noun).
Then phrase units are united meaningfully (such as a
subject, a verb, and an object). Hence, the reader needs
to know much more about the nature of language than the
listener. The reader has a practical knowledge of langu-
age that is reflected in the quality and quantity of the
strategies developed for dealing with linguistic inputs.
in the situations in which speech and writing
are used . Context is always a part of language compre-
hension, whether oral or written. The context of simple
everyday speech is usually external
—
present in the situa-
tion in which the oral communication occurs. Most written
communication, however, must provide its own context
within the text alone. But whether or not the reader
understands the context provided by the writer depends
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largely on the prior knowledge of the reader. The
reader must pay more attention to the setting and continue
to employ that information for the comprehension of
successive paragraphs.
n listener, on the other hand, is in an oral communi-
cation mileau tailored to his or her needs. In face-to-face
communication, interaction, even non-verbal gestures,
affects comprehension significantly, a speaker may repeat
or restate a point prompted by little more than a quizzi-
cal look on a listener’s face. More direct verbal question-
ing or requests for clarification further adjust oral com-
munication to needs of the listener.
Cognitive demands on the reader . Other than the contribu-
tion of prior knowledge for providing a framework for com-
prehension, the reader has recourse primarily to the text
for understanding. The demands on the reader are complex:
he is called upon to recall personal knowledge, to organize
new information, and to search out linguistic cues in
which the information is embedded. (Schallert, et al
. ,
1977)- The struggle for comprehension by a beginning
reader is great, but once skill is attained the reader
carries out these three processes simultaneously. More-
over, he or she is able to predict upcoming letters, words,
and even ideas which lessens the cognitive processing
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necessary for comprehension (Smith, 1971). Finally, the
skilled reader seems able to monitor his or her continu-
ing comprehension of the text and to evaluate the informa-
tion in the text in relation to his or her purposes for
reading (Schallert et al,,1977). A reader in order to
understand written text has developed a number of skills
which may not be developed by a listener.
In summary, the listener usually has a readily per-
ceivable environmental context for reference; furthermore,
a listener may mere easily correct momentary comprehension
difficulties. To compensate for the loss of environmental
context and the unavailability of further explanation, the
reader must pay strict attention to the text to establish
the meaning of the information. I have argued that by
having to rely on the world for information a reader
develops linguistically-based semantic and syntactic
strategies which are useful in all comprehension, oral or
written
.
The thrust of the argument in the preceding para-
graph runs contrary to a common assumption by educational-
ists and psychologists that language skills are developed
independently from and prior to reading comprehension
skills. The assumption of the preeminence of language
skills seems to be pervasive. This is so, I think, be-
cause little research has been done with mature subjects
6o
who have no or possibly limited reading skills. In the
West, since the only subjects with limited reading skills
also are quite young, the effects are confounded with
maturational processes and general language development.
The implication derived from the assumption of the pre-
eminence of language skills--that by augmenting language
skills, reading skills can be enhanced--is acceptable.
Undoubtedly, reading comprehension increases as
language skills are enhanced. Weaver (1977, reported in
Adams, 1977) devised a successful methodology for increasing
syntactic sensitivity on that assumption. Third graders
were instructed individually on solving sentence anagrams.
The children were taught strategies of picking out phrases
and clauses from the scrambled words and then of arranging
them into a complete sentence. In essence, the children
learned to attend to word order, different parts of speech,
and the syntactic devices by which phrases and clauses
are signaled. By-products of the tutorial sessions were
improvement on "several other" (though unspecified) tests
of reading comprehension and memory.
Were these children not confronted with the task of
solving sentence anagrams (unique to most school settings)
and assisted individually, it is plausible to assume that
the reported gains in reading comprehension and memory
And
,
would have been made over a period of time anyway.
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perhaps, say by the sixth grade, the students would be able
to solve the sentence anagrams unassisted. For .'Jeaver's
subjects, the linguistic strategies resulted from a
specific, planned, and guided practice with language--
sentence anagrams. Other children who do not have
that type of practice can eventually develop the strategies
for solving anagrams, and for better reading comprehension,
by other means. Simply because augmenting language skills
enhances reading skills, the reverse relationship is not
precluded
.
There is evidence of a reverse relationship which
shows that aural comprehension seems to be better in good
readers. A study by Oaken, Weiner, and Cromer (1973)
compared aural comprehension of good readers and poor readers
at the fifth grade level. The complete study was rather
complicated and only part of it will be described here.
Tape-recorded stories were made by good readers and poor
readers reading aloud the story passages. Since the ex-
perimenter interrupted and corrected reading errors as
the tape was being made, each taped story differed in rate
of presentation, amount of errors, interruptions, and
corrections. Then, both good readers and poor readers
listened to all taped stories and were tested for com-
prehension by multiple choice questions. Listening to good
readers' taped stories, the poor readers comprehended
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approximately as well as good readers. The good readers,
however, comprehended just as well when listening to the
poor readers' tapes as to the good readers' tapes. Poor
readers, on the other hand, comprehended much better when
listening to good readers than when listening to the story
read by the poor readers. The results suggest that poor
readers do not suffer from a general comprehension defici-
ency when listening under ideal conditions. Good readers,
however, are able to make up for irregular prosodic cues
of those who were reading the story poorly and, through the
use of presumably linguistic strategies, to understand
the story.
Evidence, as that contributed by the Oaken, et al
.
study
,
makes more plausible the contention that learning
to read may provide the non-contextual practice with langu-
age necessary to develop linguistically-based comprehension
strategies. These strategies are applicable to all language
comprehension situation--written or oral.
Perhaps my argument is one-sided because the field
study reported herein v/as not longitudinal and can only
demonstrate correlations between reading comprehension
skill and syllogism-solving and concomitant premise com-
prehension. It may never be possible to demonstrate
conclusively that the acquisition of reading skill affects
language comprehension. Forming a control group by de-
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som6 ch.ild.F6n of fh© oppoFfunify "to l63.Fn “to Fes-d
is unethical. One expeFimental design which could make
the causal Felationship between litenacy acquisition and
language compnehension moFe plausible is companing the
genenal language compnehension skills of noFmal FeadeFS
and dyslexic FeadeFS (not suffening fFom some otheF lin-
guistic deficiency). OtheF useful expeFimental designs
include the one used in this study--to coFFelate penfoF-
mance in language compnehension with skill in Feading
compFehension among manginally litenate adults who would
have otheFwise completed the intellectual development
attFibuted to childFen. Ideal subjects would be non-liteFate
adults tested befoFe and afteF adult liteFacy courses. It
is, however, most disheartening, due primarily to social
factors, that the prognosis for successful acquisition of
reading skills in adult literacy programs is poor.
Conversion
Conversion stems from the inadequate or incomplete
memory for the information presented. Conversion occurs
when the elements and relationships which defined the
information are either missing from, mistaken, or mis-
placed within the memory representation. Many constructions
are theoretically possible from one internally represented
sentence--for example, a recall of "The cat chased the rat
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IS equivalent to the original "It was the rat that was
chased by the cat." However, an internally represented
sentence which has been converted does not allow for an
equivalent construction of the original information.
Conversion is not limited to the premises of syllogisms,
rather it is possible in any comprehension. It is, however,
most evident in situations where the deviance between input
and output is observable. The party game, "Gossip,"
in which each guest whispers some statement to another in
turn until everyone has participated, provides an opportu-
nity for an informal observation of how a statement under-
goes conversion.
There are several reasons why an original statement
may be distorted in its recall. One prime source of
distortion is that comprehension, whether from a medium
or some other source, is always made in terms of previous
knowledge and experience. If new information and old
knowledge are incompatible, one must be disregarded or
at least changed to conform to the other. Smith (1975)
observed that contrary previous knowledge may cause re-
jection of new information. Smith proposes an inverse
relationship: the more cognitive restructuring a piece
of information requires, the less likely it is to be be-
lieved. Understanding of and memory for new information
is made in terms of previous knowledge (Gofer, Chmielewski,
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and Brockway 1975; Dooling and Lachman, 1971). The
effects of previous knowledge on comprehension of new
knowledge are not isolated to the Third
.Vorld. It is not
unreasonable to expect that conversion resulting from an
interference of previous knowledge is equally prevalent
among sophisticated literates as among Third World
villagers. Although it is working in all comprehension,
previous knowledge as a source of conversion is not the
primary focus in this study.
The second source of conversion is the one, I aver,
is responsible for the irreconcilable differences in
syllogism performance between non-literate Third World
villagers and the literate Western urban dweller. It is
due to lack of strategies, specifically linguistic
strategies, applicable to the task of comprehension. This
particular type of conversion is more easily manifested in
the task of solving a syllogism, where language compre-
hension must be strict.
The syllogism is unique among most communication
settings because primarily linguistic strategies are
required to understand the syllogism premise. Contextual
or global strategies simply do not work. Gleaning cues
from an environment serves no purpose; neither does lis-
tening for nouns and "inventing" relationships or applying
previous knowledge. The information which is necessary and
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sufficient for the solution is contained within the words
alone. Understanding the premise is possible only by a
word-by-word consideration of the non-redundant statements
of the premise. Linguistic cues are the only viable source
for information contained in the premise, adequate
linguistic strategies allow the individual to comprehend
the premise on the basis of the linguistic cues present.
If the linguistic strategies have not been developed
sufficiently or if they are not effective then contextual
strategies may be brought to bear, but with little more
than chance effectiveness in bringing forth an accurate
internally represented premise. Comprehension is not
precise enough, and conversion of the premise is apparent
in the subject's performance.
Non-linguistic comprehension strategies used to
understand the premise may explain otherwise bizarre
responses made by Third -Vorld villagers. Constructing
the information in the premise to conform to a socially
acceptable truth or avoiding the task of the syllogism
could be construed as the reactions of a person who,
having understood the premise, refuses to play the make-
believe game. Or these behaviors could describe a person
who, not having understood completely the premise informa-
tion, is simply doing the best with what information he or
she did understand--embellishing the information with
6?
accepted facts or claiming that the task made "no sense."
Linguistic strategies are the sine q ua non of under-
standing the syllogism premise. Scribner (1975) reported
American high school students solved 90 percent of the
valid syllogisms she presented. Kpelle villagers could
solve only 53 percent of the same types of syllogisms. The
literate American high school students had the linguistic
strategies necessary to understand the premise, as did
Kpelle high school students who solved 80 percent of the
syllogisms on which the villagers did so poorly. Although
the villagers did not lack the ability to reason on their
own terms, their performance on the syllogism task per se
was inadequate because they lacked the requisite linguistic
strategies necessary to understand the syllogism.
The argument presented here contends that learning
to read for comprehension provides the experience necessary
for the development and refinement of linguistic strategies.
These are the strategies most useful for accurate compre-
hension of the premise, a prerequisite of solving syllo-
gisms. Thus people with better reading skills are more
able to solve syllogisms-- to understand the premise
without distortion and to reason acceptably on the infor-
mation given. For that reason, positive correlations
between reading skill, success at solving syllogisms, and
memory for the information in the premise are expected.
CHAPTER III
EXPERirffiNTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Hypotheses
The theoretical presentation described how the ac-
quisition of reading skills, acquired as the beginning
reader is confronted with information that is solely
linguistic, thereby fosters and refines linguistic strate-
gies directed at the semantic and syntactic cues. These
linguistic strategies allow a more precise comprehension
of the words comprising the message. More accurate
comprehension would then produce better performance on
syllogism tasks.
In this study, valid class-inclusion syllogisms and
cloze reading comprehension passages were used to establish
correlations between reading comprehension skill and
performance in the syllogism task. Although the theoreti-
cal presentation argued for causality, no practical
means presently exist to establish it. Instead, the
study hypothesized three probable correlations:
I. Reading comprehension and syllogism performance
are positively related.
This is the guiding hypothesis for the entire study and
represents the performance description of the argument
made
.
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II. The memory of the premise information is
positively related to syllogism performance.
ouch a relationship is expected by proponents of the
Conversion Hypothesis and others who argue that memory
of the syllogism premise is the sine qua non for solution
of the syllogism.
III. Reading skill and memory of the syllogism
premise are directly and positively related.
The third hypothesis completes the trilogy of relation-
ships and follows from the first two hypotheses. Reading,
skill and syllogism performance are related, and because
memory and inference are related, reading skill and
memory must be related as well.
The data collected for these three relationships
will be re-examined in the light of possible differences
in performance resulting from elaborated information in
the premise. A treatment of boosted premise information
was given for half the syllogisms . The expanded premise
provided a subject with additional linguistic information
by which to comprehend the premise more accurately.
Essentially, the intended purpose of the treatment was to
prevent or lessen the degree of conversion. Consequent
memory of the premise information and the syllogism
performance were compared between treatment and control
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conditions. Subjects performing with the elaborated
premise conditions were expected to score higher on
reasoning scores and memory indicators.
Materials
oyllogisms and treatment . The syllogisms used in this
study were similar in form to those used by Scribner
( 1975 ) in her Liberian studies. Of the four forms she
used, the two of medium-level difficulty were used in
this study so that a range of performance scores would
result
.
The syllogisms were valid and straightforward. The
form permits only one possible conclusion and that con-
clusion was adumbrated by the premise question. The two
forms were similar to the abstract skeletons:
Form A:
All A are B
No C is B
Are C then A?
Form B
:
Some A are B
All B are C
Are some A then C?
(Please see Appendix a for the complete set of syllogisms.)
The content of the syllogisms was concrete and
familiar; the syllogisms described fictional characters
similar to those common in the Anancy folk tales, in-
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digeneous to rural Jamaican culture. Nevertheless, the
situations and relationships established were not linked
to any particular story. Conclusions could not be drawn
from the subject's familiarity with the folk tales.
Each form of the syllogism above had two premise
statements: the control statement which was, like most
syllogism premise statements, non-redundant
; and the treat-
ment statement which specified amplifications of the pre-
mise information. I'he treatment statement sought only
to reinforce information already available and not to
aid the subjects in arriving at the inherent relation-
ships. A subject was given either the control or the
treatment statement of a syllogism.
Each treatment statement consisted of three sen-
tences. The first sentence was the statement as used in
the control premise. The final two statements amplified
that statement without establishing new relationships.
They were formed according to the following plan:
a) Universal affirmative statements present in both the
A and B Form ( "All red-bellied spiders live in mango
trees.") were first amplified by placing it in an environ-
mental context ( "The mango tree is the home of the red-
bellied spider."); and secondly, it was amplified by an
if-then statement of the information ("If a spider has a
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red belly it lives in a mango tree."). B) Particular
affirmatj^ statements in Form B ("Some of Anancy’s
neighbors are black bears.") were amplified by the same
environmental context ("Some black bears live near to
iinancy. ); then the quantified category was united with
other elements which could belong to the same category
("anancy, the black bears, and the other animals get
along together."). C) Treatment statements for the
Hliversal negative in Form A ( "Bredda Thomas does not live
in a mango tree.") consisted of restating that negative
relationship in the form of not liking whatever and never
having done it. ("Bredda Thomas does not like mango
trees and he has never lived in one."). The treatment
statements for the syllogisms are in Appendix A.
Recognition que^stions
. A block of nine yes-no questions
were asked after the original syllogism presentation.
Six of these questions were directed at the information
in the major premise and minor premise--three for each
premise. (The remaining three questions, "hook questions",
are described shortly.) The wording of the questions was
identical for the control and treatment statements.
Three recognition questions were directed to the
major premise; three to the minor. Of these questions
one was a restatement of the information as it was pre-
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sented; one changed the quality or quantity of the middle
term; one changed the nature of the relationship establish-
ed. However, because of the differences between the two
forms of syllogisms (Form A contained a particular
statement, "some'*; the Form B, a universal
negative, not a ) the difficulty of the questions
between Form A and Form B was not equal. The order of the
presentation within the block mixed questions for the
major and minor premise. However, for the two syllogisms
of the same form, the order as well as the make-up of
the questions were similar. Recognition questions for
each syllogism are in Appendix A.
Hook questions. The word "hook" is inspired by the in-
terrogation technique of "fishing" in which the questioner
asks for remote information which may or may not be
known by the subject. The hook questions restated the
syllogism question either identically to the premise
question or indirectly. Hook questions were to elicit
reasoning, over and above the syllogism task--answering
and justifying the answer. By restating the premise
question, hook questions allowed a performance opportunity
to show that the correct reasoning had occurred despite a
possible ineptness in explicit justification and recall
performance. As such, hook questions, like comprehension
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questions, were implicit measures. Recognition questions
measure implicitly represented information-information
which may not have been reconstructed explicitly. Hook
questions measure implicit reasoning which would have
otherwise gone unnoticed by the demands of the syllogism
task
.
Three yes-no hook questions were interspersed with
the recognition questions, but they were preceded by the
phrase Do you know that..." to distinguish them from the
recognition questions preceded by the phrase "Did I tell
you that..." Phis was done to preclude fine distinctions
between actually presented information and the invited
inference. One of the hook questions was a question of
opposite intent ( "Do you know that Bredda Thomas is not
a red-bellied spider?") and a second question fabricated
an entirely new relationship ( "Do you know that Bredda
Thomas is some animal that is not a red-bellied spider?").
The third question in the series, and always the last one
in the recognition block, was a statement of the premise
question ( "Do you know that Bredda Thomas is a red-bellied
spider?"). Granted, the questions were contrived and, at
times forced, but there were only a limited number of
ways of rephrasing a simple relationship. Hook questions
for each syllogism are in Appendix A.
75
Reading skill. Reading skill was measured through the
cloze comprehension procedure. Traditional cloze tests
omit every fifth word, and the task of the reader is to
supply an appropriate word. Cloze tests assume that the
reader will "press for meaning, despite omissions in the
text" (Kaminsky, 1979). The rationale behind the cloze
is that a reader, if he or she understands the structure
and content of the reading passage, should be able to
utilize redundancy in the text and personal knowledge of
language to predict omitted words, represented as blank
spaces, with some degree of acceptability. ?he extent to
which the reader is able to fill in the blanks meaningfully
measures reading comprehension.
The passage used in this study was a simplified
selection from one of the more well-known Anancy folk
tales--stories of a clever spider who triumphed by
trickery, living easily off the spoils of outsmarting
others in the animal kingdom. The passage itself was
written in standard English used in Jamaica for teaching
reading in the schools, rather than in the Jamaican
patois. (Although the story would be told in patois,
reading patois was simply too difficult, even for Jamaican
university graduates.) (3ee Appendix B for the intro-
duction to the cloze test, and Appendix C for the cloze
passage
.
)
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Traditional cloze procedure methodology was altered
to permit the highest response rate possible. Requiring
the subject to fill in only every sixth word increased
the semantic base of useful information by 20 percent.
In an effort to provide the subject with the utmost
opportunity for making meaning from the text, the beginning
sentences of the passage were written in full; furthermore,
to acquaint the subject with the nature of the task, the
interviewer assisted the subjects in filling in the first
six blanks by showing them how their own words would fit
into the structure of the passage.
Design
A within-subjec ts design was used to compare and
correlate subjects' performance on syllogisms of two
different grammatical forms (A and B) , Each syllogism
form had two conditions--one control (the non-redundant
premise) and the other treatment (the elaborated premise).
Each subject answers two syllogisms of each of the two
forras--one under each condition (four syllogisms in total);
that is, on Form A of the premise, the subject responded
to a control premise statement and a treatment statement,
and repeated this same exercise for Form B of the
syllogisms
.
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subjects were assigned in alternating order to one of
two groups which controlled for the presentation order
effects of the elaborated or control premise statements.
One group followed this order:
First syllogism: Form A, control
Second syllogism: Form B, treatment
third syllogism: Form A, treatment
Fourth syllogism: Form B, control
The other group followed an order switching treatment and
control
:
First syllogism: Form A, treatment
Second syllogism: Form B, control
Third syllogism: Form A, control
Fourth syllogism: Form B, treatment
at the end of the experiment a cloze passage was
administered to all subjects.
Procedures
During the introductory session with the subject,
instructions were designed to make the task as meaningful
as possible with as little threat as possible. The pro-
blems were defined as being word games, and subjects were
told that the questions could be answered simply by lis-
tening to the words and thinking about them. Instructions
emphasized that the subject did not need to know anything
about nature or to have had personal experience with the
topics of the stories; all that the subject needed to do
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was to listen carefully to the words and think about them.
The introduction also included a practice problem--a
three-term syllogism which was solved for the subject as
a demonstration. The interviewer explained that the
answer could be found by putting the various words to-
gether. The instruction sheet from which the interviewer
read is in Appendix D.
The order of the protocols in the presentation of
the syllogism was the same for each syllogism:
(1) Interviewer read the premise or treatment condi-
tion and asked the question.
(2) Subject answered the syllogism.
(3) Interviewer asked why the subject gave that
answer
.
(4) The subject gave the justification and the inter-
viewer jotted it down.
(5) The interviewer asked each question in the yes-
no recognition/hook question block and the subject ans-
wered .
(6) Interviewer repeated the premise by saying
"Now in the beginning I told you that..." and asked the
subject whether or not she remembered the story.
(7) Interviewer asked the subject to retell the
story in her own words so that the interviewer could write
it down.
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(8) The subject repeated the story (recall perfor-
mance ) .
( 9 ) The interviewer repeated the story to ascertain
whether that was all the subject had to say.
(10) The story being completed, the interviewer
stated the premise question and asked, "And what did you
tell me again?"
(11) The subject answered for the second time the
syllogism question.
After the four syllogisms were presented in this
manner, the cloze test was administered. The interviewer
explained the cloze procedure, read aloud the first para-
graph, and helped the subject fill in the first nine
blanks to make sure that the subject understood the task.
Each subject was allotted approximately ten minutes to
complete the cloze passage.
Subjects
Subjects were 112 rural adult Jamaican women dra'^m
from two communities—4l from White River, interviewed
by Amelia Williams; and 7 I from Chapelton, interviewed
by iinatol Clark. The mean age of the subjects was 40
.
5
(s.d.=17.5) 3-nd the mean years of education (regular
primary education and JAMAL classes) was 7.13 (s.d.=2.15).
The mean cloze score was 10. 09 from 32 possible blanks;
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19 percent of the women tested filled in none of the
blanks. A self-estimate of hours a week spent reading
yielded a mean of 2.10 (s.d.=2.7) for the whole sample,
oince the number of hours a week was a self-estimate
little experimental importance was placed on this measure.
43 percent of the sample did no reading. Of those who
read, the primary source of reading material was the Bible
for 66 percent of the readers; newspapers were the primary
reading material of I9 percent; magazines and romance
short stories accounted for the remainder. 70 percent of
the women tested from both areas were unemployed and had
been for a year. 20 percent were household workers. The
remaining 10 percent were "higglers" (street food venders),
nurses aids, or orderlies. (See Appendix E for the socio-
economic questionnaire.)
CHAPTER IV
Data analysis
Experimental Variables and Their IV'easurement
Despite numerous measurements, there were only three
classes of experimental variables: (1) variables repre-
senting the internal representation of the premise, (2)
variables representing reasoning, and (3) variables repre-
senting skill in reading comprehension. The socio-
economic variables included age, total education, and the
self-estimate of the amount of time spent reading.
Internal representation . The measurement used to represent
implicit internal representation—what the subject "knew"
but may not have been able to verbalize--was the recogni-
tion score based on the six yes-no recognition questions.
The recognition score was obtained by subtracting half
the number of yes-no recognition questions answered in-
correctly from the number answered correctly on any parti-
cular syllogism. Syllogisms which would have resulted in
negative scores for the recognition questions were
assigned "0"; six questions, three on each premise, yielded
a possible score of 12, hence, the maximum score on a
set was 48.
Reasoning . Three indicators of reasoning were two measures
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of the syllogism performance (both at the initial pre-
sentation and the time of recall) and the performance on
the hook questions.
^he first syllogism score was a composite of the
syllogism answer and the justification given. More weight
was given to the justification statement because another
measure, the hook score (described shortly), was designed
to measure the reasoning done without justification.
The first syllogism score was made up of two parts--points
for the syllogism answer and for the justification. Nine
points were given for the correct syllogism answer. The
cwo other alternatives were scores for maximum spread:
1, if incorrect and 0, if no answer. Up to 36 points for
the justification statement. (The scoring scheme for the
justification statement will be described shortly.) The
total possible score for one syllogism was 45, and for the
set of four, 180
.
The second syllogism score was scored in essentially
the same manner as the first syllogism score. The last
step on the syllogism protocol was to retell the story
(the premise) and to recall the answer for the syllogism
question. The reconstruction of the story constituted
the basis for the recall score (similar to the justifi-
cation score and dealt with shortly); the syllogism answer
recall was scored the same as the initial syllogism
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question (9 points for a correct answer, 1 point for an
incorrect answer; 0 for no answer). Phis answer recall
score was added to the recall score to obtain the second
score, •similar to the syllogism score, 45
points were possible for one syllogism and 180 for the
complete set.
The justification and the recall, albeit different
nuances of tasks, both called for the same response
—
the restatement of the premise. Hence, the scoring schema
for both the justification and the recall task were identi-
cal. The maximum possible for the perfect recall of one
premise was 18 points; degrees of conversion were scored
according to the type of error made:
(18) Premise stated completely and correctly.
(l6) "All" dropped as a quantifier on a universal
statement
.
(12) Quantifier was converted to another specifi-
cation, e.g. "some" changed to "all" or
dropped.
(10) Premise was stated in some barely recogniz-
able form; that is, all the elements were pre-
sent, but the relationships were unclear.
(6) '^hen another premise was present and one was
changed to factual knowledge or personal
knowledge; the factual premise was awarded
six (the other premise received whatever score
it merited) .
(4) The question was used to justify the answer,
i.e. a tautology, e.g. "Is Bredda Thomas a
red-bellied spider?" "No, because Bredda
Thomas is not a red-bellied spider."
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(2) The premise was restated diametrically
opposite to what was given, e.g. "Bredda
Thomas does not live in a mango tree."
becomes "Bredda Thomas lives in a mango
tree."
(0) The premise was omitted (an enthymeme).
(3) Both premises were factual knowledge or
personal knowledge or the task was avoided.
(Both were scored "0").
^he .justification score and the recall score were compiled
by adding the scores of the performance on each of the
two premises. 36 points represented perfect performance
for one syllogism.
The justification score and especially the recall
score can be thought of as measures of internal representa-
tion. Both required the subject to express explicitly the
information in the premise. In terms of data analysis,
however, it would be specious to correlate the justification
score with the first syllogism score or the recall score
with the second syllogism score because the scores would
be correlating with themselves.
The hook score measured reasoning on the basis of
answers to yes-no questions regarding the conclusions
possible from the premise; hence they did not require the
subject to construct whole sentences to justify answers
to the premise question. A total of five hook questions
were presented— three were in the recognition block of
yes-no questions and the premise question and the recall
question were counted as well. In order to obtain a maxi-
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mum spread in response scores, guessing on hook questions
was penalized to a greater extent than with the recogni-
tion score. The number of incorrect responses was sub-
tracted from the number of correct responses. (There
was no penalty for "don’t know" responses.) Each question
was worth two points, since a subject could score "-10"
If all hook questions were wrong, ten points were added
to obviate data analysis complications of negative scores.
A perfect hook score was 20 points, and 80 points for the
set of four.
Cloze score._ There was no penalty for guessing in the
scoring of the cloze passage. The response was judged
by its adequacy in the context of the passage with no
preconceived notion of one correct word. Also, lexical
and syntactical irregularities of the Jamaican patois were
allowed as long as the response was consistent with the
patois itself. Spelling errors were not taken into
account. There was a total of thirty-two blocks possible
for the cloze score.
Some subjects could not fill in the cloze passage
because they had poor eyesight and did not have their
glasses with them at the time of the interview. An
approximated cloze score for these individuals (a total of
eight subjects) was computed by interpolating from the
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highest and second highest correlating experimental
variables--the hook score and the recognition score.
General Performance
The averages
--mean, standard deviation (s.d.),
median, and mode--obtained for each of the experimental
variables are presented in Table 1. The scores are pre-
sented in three divisions--first
,
for the total sample of
112 subjects and then divided by interviewer: Amelia
(4l subjects) and Anatol (?1 subjects).
Table 2 presents averages obtained for the socio-
economic data obtained on each subject. The same sub-
divisions are made.
Analysis of Effects
The effects on the data of several controlled and
uncontrolled variables are analyzed at the outset so that
the subsequent correlations which are to substantiate the
hypothesis may be viewed with greater perspective. The
most significant differences were found between inter-
viewers; other data effects were attributable to practice.
The treatment condition and the form of the syllogism
yielded inconsistent results. The data for the corre-
lations of the major experimental variables is organized
to minimize the influence of these effects.
o 'X X
h-* O P
o o o
> tsi > > t-9 ^ > P P3 Ob O fD p P o P P o cn^
P rf d P c+ 0. P P CT P
c+ (D P (Ju ct CD P O c+ P P H-O M H" o o M (- O O 1-' M <rt-!- M o M P M I-' H-
P Oj P P Oj (D P Oj O
P P P3 3 3
"d PJ X C/JM M O
0) P P O
P
P
h->
M M f\)
h->
-v3
-PmM M rv3
M
-v3 PmM M W
M !-
VO t-* O CO MOx tv) roQ\j\CO
ro ONt--
-P^ 00 PO P
I-*
03 O VO M
!- MM M ro M M MO M M
U) O O vv\U\ o --<} M M
M
ON O -v3 vO O Ov VjJ ro ror\) ovvo
VO VjJU\ M -v3 ov 03 00
O O O
0\
-PO^O 00 ov
<03 r\3 ^3
VjJ ~0 -n3
00 Pj 1p H*
o P
> > M O P M W
P P o p P P O cl-
P p <7+ a P P c+ c
c+ P P c+ P P 0 . pO M M Oj O M M'c; pMM '< MM M H*
P C/J M P 0. M P
P M P O O'
3 O 3 on MX 0^ pj P* PM H* M M
P P P 3
3
0.
Oj o
o o
o p
p p
p
P
1M M O ,
^ PM
-o PM PiM M r\) M M tP
iC/3
W
M MM VO M -v3 P OV s
VO VO ro VP-0 VP p
• • • • • • p
VviUJ M O 00-0 p
VP PP VP rpvp U1
VO VO P OvvO Ov •
• • • • • « DPM M M VO O
M M S
rovo ^3 -o P Ov p
Vjv PVjJ M VP O X
• • • H*
00 -nJ OV P
P
M M
fv3 VP !\) VP M VP sP OV p OvO Ov o
o.a
0)
Z8
TABLE
1
Average
Scores
for
Experimental
Variables
Anatol
O Hi
Hj O
c+
p: - M P
T O P. M
P <r+ C
P P O (-<
I—' h-* p ro
H' cf P
P C/J H- HjPop
3 D
M
p
p
Cf^
P
5^6
P P c+
C+ P p
O h-* h-'
P u.
p
p
>
p
p
Oj S.
'p p
p p
P fv
O C+ M
<ri-
c+ P p
O M I— CD K
h-> M p O
P Oj p, C
p p.
3 PM
« at)p
p
c
p
p
H-
p
o'
M h-* fV) ^ -P^h->M P fV) I— H' fvO
O
IC/J
M
-v0 -n3 -O
• • •
rv)0 (-
U) -p^
-P
\0 fV) o
• • •
I-' OOU^
ro r\j ro
• • •
o rv> M
p
P
P
M r\) ^o
• • •
O UJ M
h-' !- M
CN^O -o
'oJ -{^
rv) VjJ jNj
• • •
0\ 0 -n3
Oi
D
-SJ-s3 -n3
• • •
0D\0 CX>
U)
-p:-U)
-X) M -n3
• • •
Xj o CX)
MOM
• • •
O VO O
ro
P
H-
P
P
00 00 00
M f\J fV)
VO O O o o o op
p
88
Average
Scores
for
Socio-economic
Variables
89
Interviewer effects. There were large unexpected differ-
ences between the subjects tested by each of the inter-
viewers. Ideally both interviewers would have worked in
the same areas on the same days . Control of this facet
of the experiment was lost due to political violence in
Jamaica at the time of the field work. In order to ensure
their safety, the interviewers worked in their respective
hometowns where they were known and trusted.
The experimental variables showed the largest differ-
ences in performance--the first syllogism score, t(110)=
- 3 . 78 , p=.001; the second syllogism score, t ( 110 ) =-2
.
39 ,
p=.018; the recognition score, t (110 ) =-2
. 55, p=.012; the
hook score, t ( 110 )=-3 . 18
,
p=.002. All of these differ-
ences showed marked superiority in subjects tested by
Anatol in Chapelton, the larger, more developed town.
Socioeconomic variables tested showed almost no differ-
ences between the interviewers' subjects--total education
( t
(
110 ) =- .41
,
p=.684), self-estimate of the amount of
time spent reading per week ( t (110 ) =- . 2?
.
p=.?85i or age
( t (110 ) =1
.
09 » p=.2?7. A chi square analysis revealed no
differences between the occupations of the subject
(x^(4o=6.65. p=.156).
Suprisingly, the clcse scores did not test signi-
ficantly different either (t(110=1.39» p=.l68). In fact,
the higher scoring tended, albeit not at all significantly.
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toward Amelia, who interviewed in a small village in
primarily sugar cane growing country near the North Coast
tourist area. The possibility of interviewer differences
in the allotment of time for the cloze reading test (10
minutes was to be allowed) was tested by counting responses
made only on the first half of the cloze test. Chere was
no significant change in the trend, so time alloted was
probably not a factor. Moreover, of the total number of
blanks filled in by a subject, Amelia's subjects answered
a marginally higher percentage of blanks correctly--68
.
5
percent vis a vis 58.6 percent for Anatol.
It is not clear whether differences between inter-
viewer's techniques or personalities and/or unmeasured
differences between the communities account for the
differences in syllogism performance. Although the two
interviewers' subjects did not differ significantly in
any of the socioeconomic data collected (age, education,
occupation, a self-estimate of hours a week spent reading)
,
the hometowns were located in two different areas in the
island. Amelia's hometown, White River, was smaller
(less than 500 population) and separated from the popular
Ocho Rios tourist area by poor roads and hills. Anatol 's
hometown, although more isolated in the center of the
island, was larger (more than 10,000 inhabitants) and was
the commercial center for several sugar estates. Un-
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measured were variables of informal participation in
economic and social activity.
^irnella was an agricultural development worker with
the Ministry of Agriculture. Her normal speech had a
monotone quality and was accompanied with an undemonstra-
tive demeanor. Anatol, on the other hand, was a former
elementary school teacher studying to be a social worker,
ohe was the far more animated of the two--both because of
her background and because of her interest in the study.
One indication that hnatol's presentations were more
informative to her subjects is the fact that only 35 per-
cent of her subjects' justifications were classified as
inadequate responses—refusing the task or importing
outside evidence for justification; on the other hand,
Amelia's subjects responded inadequately on the justifi-
cation 62 percent of the time. This possibility of
dii'f'e^rences in task delivery and the consequent information
available to the subject is addressed again in the follow-
ing section.
The effect of the treatment . The treatment of the re-
dundant premise had a mixed effect on boosting perfor-
mance. Amelia's group showed a barely significant effect
on the first syllogism score, t(4o)=-2.l4, p=.039» and
anatol 's group showed none.
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Although the total group sample yielded significant
differences between recognition score performance on
treatment and control conditions ( t ( 111 ) =- 2 . 30
, p = .024)
neither of the interviewers, when analyzed separately,
showed significant differences (Amelia: t(4o) =
-1.53,
p=.113» Anatol: t(70)=-1.69, p=.095).
The treatment condition had little effect on the hook
score (t (lll)=-1.23» p=.233 for the whole group). The
resistance of the hook score (implicit reasoning) to the
influence of the treatment which did affect the recogni-
tion score (implicit internal representation) is a little
surprising.
Part of what could have accounted for both the tre-
mendous differences in syllogism scores between the inter-
viewers and the lack of treatment-induced improvement in
anatol 's syllogism scores is the difference between the
interviewers’ deliveries in the syllogism presentations.
If the actual presentations of matol in the experimental
situation were more animated than they were in the inter-
viewer training sessions, the cues available from prosody
and stress, even when the non-redundant control form of
the premise was repeated only twice, may have been adequate
to comprehend the premise accurately. The additional
restatements were unnecessary for comprehension. Phis
explanation would account for the performance differences
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between subjects of iirnella and Anatol: the greater
resistance toward the justification task by Amelia's
subjects, and the undifferentiated performance of Anatol 's
subjects between the control and treatment conditions.
Explanations based on differences in linguistic sophisi-
tication due to urbanization would only account for differ-
ences between total scores--the treatment still should have
been effective.
The effect of the form . The two forms of the syllogism
(Form A (All-no) ; "All red-bellied spiders live in mango
trees. Bredda Thomas does not live in a mango tree"; and
Form B (oome-all) : "Some of Anancy’s neighbors are black
bears. All black bears eat berries.") have been ranked
as medium in difficulty by several experimenters (Erick-
son, 1974; Scribner, 1975)- Form A, which ranked fifth
out of 19 valid syllogisms tested by Erickson was solved
correctly more consistently than Form B, which ranked
eleventh. Comparisons between the first syllogism scores
of each form and further between the second syllogism
scores of each form did not yield any significant difference
in the difficulty of one form over another.
The recognition score demonstrated quite handily
that the yes-no questions for Form A were easier to
answer than Form B: t(lll)=6.12, p = .001. Phis rather
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cautious interpretation is made in view of the diff-
erence in the nature of the recognition questions direct-
ed at Form A and Form B. Both syllogism forms contained
a universal affirmative statement ("All red-bellied
spiders live in mango trees" and "All black bears eat
berries.") The recognition questions for these state-
ments were similar. Form A's minor premise was a uni-
versal negative statement: "Bredda Thomas does not live
in mango trees." The recognition questions were:
(1) Does Bredda Thomas live someplace that is not
a mango tree?
(2) Did I say that Bredda Thomas lives in a mango
tree?
( 3 ) Did I say that Bredda Thomas lives in a coco-
nut tree?
The major premise in Form B, a particular affirmative
statement, ("Some of Anancy's neighbors are black bears.")
had recognition questions which could have been more con-
fusing .
(1) Did I say that some of Anancy's neighbors are
black bears?
(2) Did I say that all of Anancy's neighbors are
black bears?
( 3 ) Do you think that not one of Anancy's neighbors
are black bears?
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The some" statement allowed more direct questions to pin-
point its qualification. "All" and "some" could be more
readily confused than the opposites of "does" and "does
not . "
The hook score, however, showed a trend in the
opposite direction. Hook scores for Form B were signifi-
cantly higher than for Form A; t (ill ) =-2
.
52
,
p=. 013 .
However, when broken down by interviewer, only Amelia
showed a significant difference in hook score: t(4o)=
2 . 36
,
p=.023; Anatol did not; t(70)=-1.42, p=.l6 o. The
superiority of Form B is discrepant with results obtained
by previous experimenters (Srickson, 19?4; Scribner, 1975 ).
It may be due to the design of the experiment and is
explained in the following section.
Phe effect of be tween-syllogism practice . The general
effect of practice with the information in the premise
and with the requirements of the task was evident at
two places in the experiment—between the syllogisms (the
performance on the last syllogism was superior to the first
syllogism as the subject "caught on" to the nature of the
task) and within the syllogism task itself (between the
first syllogism answer with the justification and the
recall with the second syllogism answer) . The between-
syllogism improvement is considered in this section; the
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within-syllogism improvement, in the following section.
In order to look for the effects of practice alone
(irrespective of control or treatment condition) only
syllogisms of the same form were compared by virtue of
their order of occurrence. In other words, Form A was
presented in the first and third slots—with the treat-
ment preceding the control for one experimental group,
and in the opposite order for the second experimental
group. (Subjects were assigned to one or the other
experimental group in alternating order, so each inter-
viewer had equal numbers in both groups. Thus the in-
terviewer is not a confounding factor. Form B was pre-
sented switching control and treatment orders by experi-
mental groups in the second and fourth slots. The two
Form A's were compared for the effects of order (irres-
pective of condition) as were the two Form B's.
The results are very interesting. The major be tween-
syllogism improvement was done on Form A, which occupied
the first and third slots. Three of the four syllogism
measurements showed improvement; the first syllogism
score: t (ill ) =- 3 . 06 , p=. 003 ; the second syllogism score;
t (ill ) =-4
.
15
,
p=.000; and the hook score: t (lll)=-3.64,
p=.000. The improvement was consistent between subjects
of Hrnella and Anatol on the second syllogism score and the
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hook score,- the exception was the first syllogism score,
in which only amelia’s subjects showed improvement
(tC4o)=-2,99. P=.005) on Form a. Interestingly, there
was no improvement for the recognition score for Form A,
for the total sample or by Interviewer.
On Form B which was presented in the second and
fourth slots, the order of presentation was quite muted.
In fact, the only score to show significant differences
was the second syllogism score (t(lll)=-2.87, p=. 005 )
which when separated by interviewer almost slipped from
significance (Amelia: t(4o)=-2.10, p = .o42 and Anatol:
t(70)=-2.12, p=.037).
The unexpectedly inferior performance on Form A in
relation to Form B which noted earlier can be explained
by the design of the experiment. Treatment and control
conditions were balanced and so were the two premise
stories (each of the four syllogisms had a control pre-
mise and a treatment premise which yielded eight separate
syllogism premise stories). Form A always occupied the
first and third slot and Form B, the second and fourth.
To control for the order in which the forms were presented
would have required two more groups. Since measurement of
performance on the form of the syllogism was not an issue
in the experiment, and since counterbalancing for the
effects would have doubled the experimental groups and the
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necessary subjects, the order of presentation of the form
was left uncontrolled.
The differences in success at solving the two forms
between this experiment and others done previously is now
easily explained. The marked improvement in Form A due
to the order of presentation meant that on the presenta-
tion of the first syllogism subjects were at a loss about
what was expected and hence their performance was at its
worst. Form B syllogism showed little or no improvement
in any of the measures. Hence, by the presentation of the
second syllogism the subject had more or less "caught on"
to what was expected. Because one of the Form A syllogisms
was always in the first slot, composite performance for the
two Form A syllogisms suffered. Since all other aspects
of the design were balanced, comparison of the forms
would be the only variable likely to be affected by the
design.
It is interesting to note that the recognition score
did not improve with practice in either form. Apparently,
the ability to answer straight forward yes-no questions
on information had been developed to the point where the
opportunity for practice within the protocol of the
experiment (four trials) was too short to show improve-
ment .
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of within-syllogism practice
. The recall
portion of the second syllogism task was a second opportu-
nity for the subject to construct the information in the
premise— the justification was the first. The justifi-
cation and recall scores comprised 80 percent of the first
and second syllogism scores (36 points out of a possible
45 for the syllogism score). Although the justification
and recall elicited the same response, the observed
differences in performance were the largest effects
manifest in the study: justification-recall differences
for the whole sample, t(lll)=-l8.01, p=.000; for Amelia:
t(40)=-9.98, p=.000; and for Anatol: t (?0 ) =-15 . 26
,
p= .000 .
Two factors could account for this effect. The
first is the additional practice with the information
in the premise before the recall task. By answering the
series of 6 yes-no recognition questions, the subject
could have inadvertently rehearsed the information in
the premise. Furthermore, to obviate the possibility
that no-answered questions would act as distractors, the
interviewer read the non-redundant premise form once more
before the recall and the final syllogism question.
Hence the subject had an additional opportunity to listen
to the premise. As a result, the subject had one more work
with the information between the first and second syllogism
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performance opportunities.
The other factor which could account for the dis-
parity in the scores was the differences in the task re-
quirements. Essentially the justification and the recall
elicit the same response—reconstruction of the premise,
but the tasks are quite different— the justification re-
quires answering the question, "Why do you say that?" to
whatever answer the subject had given to the premise
question; the recall asked the subject to, "...tell me
the story in your own words so that I can write it down."
The large effects observed are probably attributable to
both practice and task factors.
A closer look at the differences between the first and
second syllogism performance reveals the source of the
differences. They are in part attributable to numerous
inadequate j ustifications--answering the premise question,
"Why do you say that?" by avoiding the task or by import-
ing outside evidence. These responses were scored as "0"
out of a possible 36 points for the justification. There
were a total of 448 syllogism trials--112 subjects doing
four syllogisms apiece; of the 448 trials, on 201 trials
just under half, the subjects avoided the justification
task or imported outside evidence. On the other hand,
there were only 34 instances of avoidance or importing
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outside evidence on the later recall task. In all but
3^ of the 201 cases, some recall was made of the premise.
The subject, of course, received points for the degree
of correctness of the recall performance. On that basis
along the scores would be very different. Still it is not
clear whether the performance differences are due to
within-syllogism practice or to task variations.
another point of note is that in one third of the 201
cases of avoiding or distorting the justification task,
at least two out of the three recognition questions for
one premise were answered correctly. In other words,
in one out of three cases of inadequate responses on the
syllogism task, the subject "knew" enough about one
premise to answer two out of the three comprehension
questions for that premise correctly. The subjects seem
to have been persistently confused about the requirements
of the syllogism justification.
Floor effects plagued the first syllogism score and
ceiling effects, the second syllogism scores. The floor
effects were brought about because quite a variety of
responses--outright avoidance of the task resorting to
personal experience, or importation of evidence--were
scored as "0". The ceiling effect in the second syllogism
score could have been alleviated by the incorporation of
more difficult forms of valid syllogisms.
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The preceding section which looked at the various
effects in the data did so by using t-test after t-test--
each of the four experimental variables was compared for
the effects of interviewer, condition, form, and order.
There is, of course, a certain danger in running a great
number of t-tests on different effects for one variable.
Significances due to chance alone are more likely to become
manifest as the numbers of the tests increase. For that
reason, marginally significant differences were inter-
preted with some caution because not all apparent signifi-
cances reported may have validity.
analysis of Correlations
In order to obtain data least affected by inter-
vening variables for the correlations in support of the
hypotheses, two modifications in the data analysis are
made. First, the differences in overall performance be-
tween the subjects of the two interviewers are delineated
by analyzing the experimental data separately for each
interviewer. Secondly, since the data in support of
differences between conditions--control and treatment--were
equivocal, control and treatment scores are combined. Thus
a subject's first syllogism score, second syllogism score,
recognition score, and hook score include scores for both
conditions. The procedure of combining all scores balanced
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the differences due to form and order of presentation
as well.
Essentially, all three hypotheses regarding the
positive correlations between reading skill, success at
solving syllogisms, and memory for the premise information
were supported.
The first and third hypothese ( (I) Reading compre-
hension and syllogism performance are positively related,
and (III) Reading comprehension and memory of the syllogism
premise are positively related) are supported by the use
of linear regressions correlating the four major experi-
mental variables--the first syllogism score, the second
syllogism score, the hook score (for the first hypothesis)
and the recognition score (for the third hypothesis ) --
with the performance on the cloze procedure. A step-wise
regression was performed so that the effects of the socio-
economic variables— the total years of education, the
self-estimated amount of time spent reading per week, and
age— that might influence the equation could be explored.
In all cases, the cloze score was the first variable
entered by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
computer program (meaning that of the four--the cloze
score, education, amount of reading, and age--the cloze
score had the strongest correlation). Other variables
entered after the cloze score did not significantly change
1C4
the multiple correlation; that is, the addition of the
other scores did not increase significantly the pre-
dictability of the equation over and above the cloze score.
This was due in part to the confounding inter-correlation
between cloze score and total education (arnella: r=.348,
p-.OOO; anatol: r=.368, p=.000) and between cloze score
and amount of hours a week spent reading (Amelia: r=,487,
p=.000; matol: r=.296, p=.000). Still, the cloze score
was the single best predictor of the first syllogism score,
the second syllogism score, the recognition score, and
the hook score.
There were discrepancies between the correlations for
the linear regressions obtained for Amelia and Anatol.
The correlations with the cloze score were much higher
for Amelia, who tested in the smaller town. The cloze
score explained 52.6 percent of the variance on the
syllogism score for Amelia’s group (F(l
, 39 ) =43 . 2? , p=.000),
as contrasted with 23.9 percent for Anatol (F(1,69)=21.67,
p=.000). The other scores followed suit--the cloze score
usually accounting for at least twice as much variance
for Amelia than for Anatol: 53*6 percent of the variance
on the second syllogism score for Amelia (F (1
,
39 ) =44
.
97 ,
p=.000) as contrasted with 26 percent for ilnatol
( F(l
,
69 ) =24 . 24
,
p=.000)i 44.5 percent of the variance for
the hook score for arnella (F( 1 , 39 ) =31 • 28 , p=.000);
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16.4 percent for Anatol (F(l,69)=13.48, p=.000) and
45.9 percent of the variance on the recognition score for
Hrnella (F (1
, 39)=33 . 15. p=.000); 33-9 percent of the
variance for Anatol (F(l,69)=35.42, p=.000). Despite the
great differences in the percentages of variance accounted
for, for subjects of both interviewers, the cloze score
was always significant and consistently the strongest
correlation among the socioeconomic variables entered.
The first and third hypotheses--that reading skill
would correlate positively with (l) syllogism performance
and (2) memory for the syllogism were substantiated by
results from both interviewers despite the significant
discrepancy in the scores between the two interviewers.
The second hypothesis dealt with the relationship
between the memory for the premise and syllogism perfor-
mance. Correlations between the recognition score with
the first and the second syllogism scores and the hook
score were significant (p=.000), positive, and quite high
with little difference between Amelia and Anatol. The
similarity in the strength of correlations with the recog-
nition score for all three scores is striking--for the
first syllogism score (Amelia: r=.686, p=.000; Anatol
r=.644, p=.000); the second syllogism score (Amelia:
r=.609, p=.000; Anatol r=.6?4, p=.000); for the hook score
(Amelia: r=.6l2, p=.000; Anatol: r=.632, p=.000).
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These high correlations support the notion that perfor-
mance on the syllogism task is related to an accurate
internally represented premise information. The high
correlation held for both the explicit syllogism task
including restatement of the premise in the justification
or recall and the implicit reasoning measure, the hook
score
.
^ LjPPl^^ntal analyses . A conjecture was made in the
Chapter II that subjects responding to the syllogism
question by avoiding the task or by importing evidence
would convert the premises because they did not have
linguistic strategies to understand them. The
argument predicted that the reading ability of these
subjects would be lower. An examination of the instances
in which subjects avoided the syllogism task supported
this argument. Of the 448 cases, in 201 cases the subjects
avoided the task or imported evidence. The cloze score
for this group of 201 cases was compared with the cloze
scores for the 24? remaining cases that did not avoid the
syllogism task. The difference was significant ( t (446 )
=
6 . 71 ,
p=.000); the mean cloze score for the subjects in avoidance
or importation of evidence was 7.08; the mean cloze score
for the remainder who justified in some reasonable
fashion, was 12 . 53 * (The mean cloze score for the entire
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sample is 10.09.)
Even more striking was the comparison between subjects
who performed inadequately on the recall task and those
who did not. Despite the marked improvement between
justification and recall scores; still there were 34 cases
in which subjects for the recall task avoided the task
or imported outside evidence. The subjects comprising the
34 cases had a mean cloze score of 2.?; the mean cloze
score for the entire sample was 10.09. The groups were
significantly different, but because the numbers of cases
in the two groups were so different (34 versus 4l4) the
SPoo separate variance estimate was used ( t (64 . 15)
=
9 . 69 ,
p= . 000 )
.
Cloze scores were significantly lower for the cases of
subjects who avoided the syllogism task or imported out-
side evidence. Because the data used for these analyses
represent the cases of four repeated measures on each
subject, it is conceivable that a single subject could
be represented in both groups. Interpretation from this
data must be tempered; still the significances are quite
high.
The Role of Schooling
It was impossible to abstract the role of schooling
by correlational analysis because 75 percent of the sample
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had completed from seven to nine years of schooling.
Considering the average age of the subjects. (4o.5 years),
this meant that quite a wide-spread rural educational
system was in existence a quarter of a century previous.
The restricted range of schooling bode ill for correlations
with the major experimental variables— only two were barely
significant (for Amelia, the first solution score, r=.366,
p=.079 and the second solution score, r=.359, p=.021).
Unfortunately, no conclusions can be drawn from such
uniform data.
Summary
. The lower correlations of all of Anatol’s experi-
mental variables with the cloze score (thus accounting
less for the variability in performance) is likely due to
the probable difference in the presentation of the task.
The prosody and gesticulation in Anatol's task presenta-
tion probably made available marginally more information
useful to all her subjects irrespective of reading
ability. Thus the cloze score was inferior as a predictor
of syllogism performance when compared with performances
by Amelia's subjects, xlnatol's task presentation pro-
bably also accounted for the ineffectiveness of the
treatment form of the syllogism premise among her subjects.
Apparently, control condition subjects were able to glean
enough information from the prosody and gesticulation of
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the presentation to comprehend the premise about as well
as subjects who heard the elaborated treatment premise.
On the other hand, arnella's subjects who may have
lacked the cues from prosody and gesticulation had to
rely on semantic and syntactic cues for comprehension.
The cloze score was hence a better predictor because
strategies utilizing semantic and syntactic cues are
developed during reading acquisition. These results are
consistent with Oaken, et al. (1973) who demonstrated
good readers were superior in listening comprehension when
the oral presentations were deficient in prosodic cues.
Furthermore, the probable lack of prosody and gesticula-
tion in the presentation made the additional information
in the treatment condition significant in the syllogism
performance for Amelia's group.
Additionally, the effects of the cultural demands
on language usage in a commercial community could explain
why the cloze score accounted for less variability in the
performance of Anatol's subjects. The commercial mileau
demanded a more precise comprehension and usage of language
on the part of all inhabitants. The practice with langu-
age fostered by the cultural mileau affected the perfor-
mance on the syllogism task creating lower correlations
with the single measurement of the cloze score.
One interesting characteristic of Anatol's correla-
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tions is worthy of note. Some subjects with low cloze
scores (4 points or below--mean=9
.
20 ) performed above aver-
age on the syllogism task (better than 73 point). In
other words, among 26 subjects with low cloze scores,
although the majority performed below average on the ex-
perimental tasks, 4 performed above average. On the other
hand, subjects with high cloze scores tended to do well
on the experimental task almost without exception . The
same pattern emerged on the second syllogism score with
8 of the low cloze score subjects performing above the
group average. Not being able to read well did not pre-
clude a subject from doing well on the syllogism task;
being able to read well did mean high performance on the
syllogism task.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Summary and Conclusions
The difficulties in the interpretation of the data--
not being able to infer the extent to which the differences
found in the two groups were due to differences in cultural
mileau or differences in presentation of the syllogism
task--permit only cautious conjectures in regard to
possible cause-and-effect relationships between reading
comprehension and skill at solving syllogisms. The
correlations were positive, as predicted, and were con-
sistent between the interviewers even though the strength
of the correlation varied. Correlations of the first
syllogism score and the second syllogism score with cloze
score support the contention of the overall effect of the
acquisition of literacy skills on syllogism performance.
In this particular task, the subjects were called upon
to verbalize the substance of their reasoning and to
express explicitly their recall of the syllogism. Read-
ing comprehension also correlated positively with the
components of syllogism solving—understanding the premise
(the recognition score) and reasoning done without the
burden of explicit justification (the hook score). These
consistent positive relationships warrant consideration of
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a causal relationship between the acquisition of literacy
and the comprehension of language required on a syllogism
task.
Chapter II made a theoretical argument of how the ac-
quisition of reading skills results in better comprehen-
sion of language as measurable by the task of solving
syllogisms. First, rational links were made between the
task of solving syllogisms and the integral process of
language comprehension based on the words-as
-given. The
point was established that the sine qua non of solving a
^yll^si^^ is understanding the premise accurately. In
support of this, cross-cultural studies were examined
which showed that not understanding the premise seemed to
be the non-literate Third World villagers
'
greatest pro-
blem .
Oral language comprehension was conceptualized as being
a product of the interaction of two types of cognitive
strategies
—
contextual strategies which take into account
cues from the environmental situation, including prosody
and gesticulation, and linguistic strategies which are
directed to semantic and syntactic cues of the language.
The development of language comprehension in children
was examined to support the contention that contextual
strategies are developed first and are quite persistant
throughout life. Studies of communication patterns in
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non-literate cultures demonstrated that in these settings
with a high degree of shared assumptions, contextual
strategies may play a predominant role in comprehension.
The lack of contextual cues in a communication sit-
uation is likely to enhance the development or refinement
of linguistic strategies for language comprehension. The
acquisition of the skill of reading was suggested as ideal
practice in comprehension of language which provides few
contextual cues which are not a part of the written text.
Other factors, such as the cultural demands for precise
meaning in language, may also act to develop and refine
linguistic strategies. These linguistic strategies are
then useful in all language comprehension situations--
oral as well as written.
In the particular task used in this experiment,
solving and justifying valid class inclusion syllogisms,
linguistic strategies provide the basis for the accurate
understanding of the premise which allows correct solu-
tions of syllogisms . In the light of the requirements of
the syllogism task, conversion was re-examined on its role
in syllogism performance and language comprehension in
general. The absence or inadequacies of linguistic
strategies were cited as one of the prime contributors to
conversion in comprehension and inadequate performance.
The theory was presented as the study's justification
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and rationalization of the effects of the acquisition of
reading. Because this study was exploratory and sought
to unite the acquisition of literacy, comprehension of
language, and syllogism performance only in the broadest
terms, the theoretical justification made linkages which
were only reasoned and not themselves the subject of
empirical evidence. The concept of strategies was a
fictional convenience denoting an interaction of the
processes of attention and memory. Moreover, throughout
the presentation only semantic and syntactic cues^were
spoken of as the complete source of information in written
language. Given the present state of knowledge, it is
possible that other cues may be available in written lang-
uage.
The data, as analyzed, is consistent with the theory
but differences between the subjects of the interviewers
left unresolved the extent of influence of the presentation
of the interviewer and the role of cultural demands for
precise meaning in language. Anatol's subjects performed
uniformly better on the syllogism tasks than Amelia’s
subjects even though there was no difference in the cloze
performance. It is likely that there was more non-
linguistic information in Anatol's presentations. More-
over, Anatol interviewed in a larger town with more
commercial activity. The differences between the cultural
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importance of information as determined by economic and
social factors probably contributed to how well the subjects
were able to deal with language per se, thus accounting
for some of the differences between Amelia and Anatol.
Attributing some of the differences between the
subjects of the interviewers to cultural mileau is a con-
sistent extension of previous research reported in Green-
field ( 1972 ) which was done by Cole, Gay, and Glick. They
showed that even non-literate members of literate societies
(in this case, the Vai of Liberia who have long had a
script for their language) could describe to a listener
unseen stimulus material more effectively than their oral
tradition society Kpelle counterparts could, (As might
have been expected, literate Vai did better than non-
literate Vai (bcribner and Cole, 1978).) Research such
as this highlights the influence of culture on language
usage and hints at the role that a written language and
literacy may play.
Any assertions of the causal relationships should be
tempered by the recognition that the acquisition of
reading skill is not the only cause which may result in
better comprehension in language. Literacy acquisition
is not the sole contributor to semantic and syntactic
strategies of language comprehension (and hence to ability
to understand syllogisms), but in the broadest interpre-
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tation, the results of this study coupled with the thrust
of the theory presented, the acquisition of literacy in
all probability helps to foster development of semantic
and syntactic strategies which in turn enable better over-
all language comprehension and better performance on the
syllogism task.
Implications for Future Research
It is among the easier tasks for an experimenter to
recommend further research in the area of a recently
completed study, especially when collecting sufficient
data to demonstrate empirically each of the links in the
theoretical framework presented would require extensive
further research. Were this particular type of experi-
ment to be repeated, I would recommend the use of one
interviewer working in several socioeconomic settings
because different interviewers, no matter how well re-
hearsed, can bring about differences in responses.
Several settings with economic differences would be in-
structive because the cultural demands on communication
may affect language comprehension and hence syllogism
performance and possibly could be isolated more readily
with a single interviewer. Ideally, of course, the subjects
would be chosen to have a range of educational backgrounds
and reading comprehension scores. In samples chosen
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randomly from a community, ideal distributions are rarely
attained. Even given an ideal range of subjects, it would
probably be impossible to separate statistically the
effects due to acquisition of literacy from the effects
of schooling beyond the acquisition of literacy. School-
ing effects beyond the acquisition of literacy would in-
clude the acquisition of numeracy or the demands for oral
expression or explanation which the teacher placed on the
student
.
The treatment, the recognition questions, and the hook
questions were useful instruments to measure different
aspects of syllogism performance although they were pro-
bably imperfect measures influenced by the presentation
of the interviewer. The treatment seems especially liable
to differences in presentations of the syllogism task. If
the recall task were changed to a true second attempt at
the syllogism—not asking the subject to repeat the story
but to state again why exactly the subject answered the way
he or she did—stronger conclusions could be drawn about
the affect of practice with the information. The use of a
multiple-choice cloze procedure instead of one in which a
subject has to fill in the blanks might result in a
smoother distribution of cloze scores and hence stronger
correlations with other experimental and socioeconomic
variables
.
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Research conducted with pre-literate and semi-literate
subjects may, in time, add credance to the contention that
reading acquision does have an impact on language com-
prehension. Language comprehension studies, per se, have
not been done in cross-cultural settings. Perhaps when
results from language comprehension studies are combined
with the results from tangentially related tasks, such as
solving syllogisms or Piaget's conservation tasks, and
placed in a context of economic development, schooling,
and the acquisition of literacy, their influence on "human
thinking" will become more apparent.
Implications to Education
In conclusion, an important recommendation for
educational policy decisions can be derived from this
study. The basis for the recommendation is drawn from
two sources. First, the positive correlations between
reading comprehension skill and language comprehension
which were established in the data analysis are considered
to substantiate the theoretical contention that the ac-
quisition of literacy resulted in better language compre-
hension. The experimental design could not support this
contention conclusively--the effect of the acquisition of
literacy on language comprehension is assumed for the sake
of this argument. Secondly, several suppositions regard-
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ing the interrelationships between language, knowledge,
and economic development are made and discussed briefly.
Given the assumptions and the line of reasoning, the
implications of this study to the field of education can
be made
.
Any medium (denotation systems of elements and rules)
language, time, measurements, mathematics, even music--
is a carrier of information; the more articulated the ele-
ments, the more precise the medium can be in description.
A sub-set of the information which a medium can depict
is knowledge. Knowledge is information about events,
relationships, procedures; in cultures steeped in scienti-
fic tradition knowledge may be conceptualized as truth or
principles. It is a moot philosophical point whether all
knowledge can be expressed through mediums; undeniably,
a great deal of useful knowledge can be expressed through
mediums, and that is the present focus.
The adage "Knowledge is power" is true both individu-
ally and culturally. Competency in a job is made up in
part by knowledge. Job competency generally leads to
promotion and greater personal benefits. In broad econo-
mic terms, knowledge contributes directly to productivity
and a nation must be productive in order to retain its
economic and political solvency.
These arguments for the beneficial effects of know-
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X6dg6 3.1CQ csn'trs.l “to ©Ismsri'ts.Fy sd.ucs.'tion. Ths scQ^uisi —
tion of literacy is the key to knowledge imbedded in the
language medium; the ability to comprehend the spoken word
only when situational cues are also present is insuffi-
cient to understand knowledge imbedded in more precise
linguistic structures. The accumulation of this know-
ledge may result in personal gain or, more broadly, in
economic development, or the preservation of Western cul-
ture. Olson ( 1978 ) in an article which traced the effects
that the development of alphabetic writing systems had
on the nature of knowledge, concluded:
The bias of written language toward providing
definitions, making all assumptions and premises
explicit, and observing the formal rules of logic
produces an instrument of considerable power for
building an abstract and coherent theory of reality.
The development of this explicit, formal system
accounts, I have argued, for the predominant fea-
tures of Western culture and for our distinctive
ways of using language and our distinctive modes of
thought. (p.2?8)
Traditionally, schools have been the cultural in-
stitution charged with the responsibility for passing on
knowledge. The classical approach holds that this is
done through mastery of the three R's. In recent decades,
however, graduation from high school has not guaranteed
literacy. Schemes to take the pain out of learning to
read and write have supplanted much language instruction
with promises that knowledge may be gained from other
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mediums. Any educational program which diminishes the
importance of literacy runs the risk of thwarting the
acquisition of structured bodies of knowledge of social
and economic value, most of which can be transmitted only
in linguistic terms because it exists only or chiefly in
linguistic terms.
The blame for the devaluation of literacy in recent
decades may not be ascribed entirely to educational
policy makers. It must be shared by certain scholars who,
in their culturally-isolated studies of cognitive develop-
ment, have been oblivious to the effects of the acquisition
of literacy because it is common to all their subjects.
Pi3,get, for example, did not take into account literacy's
contribution to cognitive development.
There have been voices to the contrary, chiefly from
the liberal arts, Havelock (I963) and Goody and Watt
(1968). Now some psychologists are reconsidering the
effects of the acquisition of literacy--01son (I978),
Donaldson ( 1978 ) • But in a culture mesmerized by visual
media and infatuated with notions of "autonomous" cogni-
tive development, their voices tend to be drowned. To
preserve literate society and its economic and technologi-
cal advantages, heed must be paid to the importance of
literacy in schooling.
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Appendix A
The Syllogisms, the Treatment Passages,
and the Yes-No Questions.
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FORM A; Syllogism 1.
Control Condition;
All red-bellied spiders live in mango trees.
Anancy's friend, Bredda Thomas does not live in a mango tree.
I told you that all red-bellied spiders live in mango trees,
and that Bredda Thomas does not live in a mango tree
.
Tell me something now, is Bredda Thomas a red-bellied
spider?
Treatment Condition;
All red-bellied spiders live in mango trees. The mango
tree is the home of the red-bellied spider. If a spider
has a red belly, it lives in a mango tree.
Anancy's friend, Bredda Thomas, does not live in a mango
tree. Bredda Thomas does not like mango trees and he has
never lived in one. I told you that all red-bellied spiders
live in a mango tree.
Tell me something now, is Bredda Thomas a red-bellied
spider?
129
Form A; Syllogism 1 continued
Ma.jor Premise Questions;
1.
Tell me now, did I say that worms live in manso
trees? ^
Did I say that red-bellied spiders live in a
garden?
3* Did I say that red-bellied spiders live in mango
trees?
Minor Premise "Questions
:
1. Does Bredda Thomas live someplace that is not a
mango tree?
2. Did I say that Bredda Thomas lives in a mango tree?
3« Did I say for sure that Bredda Thomas lives in a
coconut tree?
Hook Questions in Recognition Block;
1. Do you know for a fact that Bredda Thomas is a
worm?
2. Is Bredda Thomas some animal that is not a red-
bellied spider?
3. Is Bredda Thomas a red-bellied spider?
FORM A; Syllogism 2
Control Condition;
Listen carefully now, some of Anancy's neighbors are black
bears
.
All black bears eat berries.
Now I told you that some of Anancy's neighbors are black
bears, and that all black bears eat berries.
Lell me something now, do some of Anancy's neighbors eat
berries?
Treatment Condition:
Listen carefully now, some of Anancy's neighbors are black
bears. Some black bears live near to Anancy, and Anancy,
the black bears, and the other animals get along together.
All black bears eat berries. Black bears eat berries from
bushes in order to live. If a bear is black it will eat
berries
.
Now I told you that some of Anancy's neighbors are black
bears
,
and that all black bears eat berries
.
Tell me something now, do some of Anancy's neighbors eat
berries?
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FORM A; Syllogism 2 continued
Ma.ior Premise Questions;
1. Did I say that some of Anancy's neighbors wereblack bears?
2. Did I say all of Anancy's neighbors were blackbears?
3« Do you think that not one of Anancy's neighbors
are bears?
Minor Premise Questions;
1. Tell me now, did I say that large bears eat
berries?
2. Did I say that black bears never eat berries?
3. Do black bears eat berries?
Hook Questions in Recognition Block;
1. Do you know for a fact that not one of Anancy's
neighbors eats berries?
2. Do you know that all of Anancy's neighbors eat
berries?
3. Do some of Anancy's neighbors eat berries?
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FORM B; Syllog^ism ?
Control Condition;
Listen carefully now, all green lizards eat mosquitoes.
Anancy s friend, Sista Camille does not eat mosquitoes.
O.K. I told you that all green lizards eat mosquitoes,
and that Sista Camille does not eat mosquitoes.
Pell me something now, is Sista Camille a green lizard?
Treatment Condition;
Listen carefully now. All green lizards eat mosquitoes.
Green lizards eat mosquitoes in order to live. If a lizard
is green, then it will eat mosquitoes.
Anancy s friend, Sista Camille, does not eat mosquitoes.
Sista Camille thinks mosquitoes must taste terrible. In
fact, she has never eaten one.
O.K. I told you that all green lizards eat mosquitoes,
and that Sista Camille does not eat mosquitoes.
Tell me something now, is Sista Camille a green lizard?
133
FORM B; Syllogism 3 continued;
Ma.ior Premise;
1. Tell me now, did I say that frogs eat mosquitoes?
2. Did I say that green lizards eat moths?
3. Did I say that green lizards eat mosquitoes?
Minor Premise;
1. Does Sista Camille eat something that is not
mosquitoes?
2. Did I say that Sista Camille eats mosquitoes?
3. Did I say for a fact that Sista Camille eats
lizards?
Hook Questions in Recognition Block;
1. Do you know for a fact that Sista Camille is a
frog?
2. Is Sista Camille some animal that is not a green
lizard?
3. Is Sista Camille a green lizard?
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FORM B; Syllogism 4
Control Condition;
Listen well now, some of Anancy's friends are yellow bugs.
Hll yellow bugs lay white eggs.
You understand that some of Anancy’s friends are yellow
bugs and that all yellow bugs lay white eggs.
Can you tell me now, do some of Anancy's friends lay
white eggs?
Treatment Condition:
Listen to me now, some of Anancy's friends are yellow bugs.
Anancy likes yellow bugs and has many friends who are
yellow bugs along with his other friends.
All yellow bugs lay white eggs. In white eggs the bugs
have their young. If a bug is yellow, its egg is white.
You understand that some of Anancy's friends are yellow
bugs and that all yellow bugs lay white eggs.
Can you tell me now, do some of Anancy’s friends lay white
eggs?
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FORM B; Syllogiism 4 continued;
Ma.jor Premise;
1. Did I say that some of Anancy's friends were
yellow bugs?
2. Did I say that all of Anancy's friends are yellow
bugs?
3. Do you think that not one of Anancy’s friends is
a yellow bug?
Minor Premise
;
1. Tell me now, did I say that big bugs lay white
eggs?
2. Did I say that yellow bugs never lay white eggs?
3. Did I say that yellow bugs lay white eggs?
Hook Questions in Recognition Block:
1. Do you know for a fact that none of Anancy's
friends lay white eggs?
2. Do you know that all of Anancy’s friends lay white
eggs?
3. Do some of Anancy’s friends lay white eggs?
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Appendix B
Instructions for the Cloze Passage
On this page there is written a story about Anancy
and Lizard. I am going to ask you to read it to your-
self, but it is different from just reading because you
can help make up the story by filling in the blanks with
words which you think belong there. If you feel that a
word that you know belongs there in the story and in the
sentence, you write the word in.
I’ll help you with the first paragraph.
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Appendix C
The Cloze Passage
Once upon a time King Robert had a very pretty
daughter who had a secret name which only she and her
father knew. One day when her father thought that she
was old enough to get married, the King went out
said that any man who could
secret name would
Anancy
the princess's
her for his wife
.
Lizard who lived in the
yard and who were very
minds they were going to try
friends, made up their
find out
the princess's secret . So the two of them
ground
out for the King's palace. walked upon the
Anancy spun a web and walked
the air.
When the two them got to the palace
Anancy just sailed over
but poor Lizard was crawling under
wall like nothing flat,
palace gate, one of the birds chased him away.
So ran and hid himself in of one of
whatthe trees the palace and waited to
happened to Anancy
.
Anancy upon the air on the that
he made and went the King's palace and hid
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in the princess's bedroom closet. And the princess
was going to Anancy saw the King kiss
upon her cheek and heard say, "I hope you sleep
f rny little Kosuka." Anancy heard he
said and caught the
,
So Anancy made up his to go home and dress
himself and come back to the princess
.
Anancy sailed back the palace upon his web.
was whispering the princess's name and
over to himself to prevent from forgetting it,
"Kosuka! Kosuka! Kosuka!"
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Appendix D
Interviewers' Preliminary Instruction to Sub.iects
Goodmorning, I am i am conduct-
ing interviews as a part of a study being conducted by
the University of Massachusetts here in Jamaica. The
study is about how people with different educational
levels reason about stories. All that it requires is for
you to think about the stories that I am going to tell
you and then for you to answer the questions that I am
going to ask you. It is not difficult; all you must do
is listen carefully about my stories and answer the
questions about what I said. No doubt, you will think
that it is simple and childs play, and you will probably
enjoy doing it. I hope you can spare me a little time.
Before I start, can you tell me a little about yourself?
(The socioeconomic status questionnaire was asked
orally
.
)
I am going to ask you to play some word games with
me. I am going to tell you a short story about Anancy and
his animal friends, then I am going to ask you some
questions about the story I told you. The questions can
be answered by listening to the words of the story and think-
ing about them. Then I'll ask you to tell me in your own
words the story that I told you, so that I can write it
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down.
For example, I tell you: "All Anancy's animal friends
can talk to each other. And all animals that can talk to
each other are clever." Next, I'll ask you: "Are all
of anancy's friends clever?" Then you will tell me,
yes or no. In this case you would tell me "yes."
And when I ask you why you would say because all of
Anancy's friends can talk to each other, and that all
animals that can talk to each other are clever. You see,
by putting the words together, you know that Anancy's
friends are clever. You do not need to worry whether
the story is true. Then I will ask you some questions
about what I told you, so try to remember the exact words
of the story. For instance, I might ask you: "Did
I tell you that some of Anancy's friends talk to each
other?" You would tell me because what I actually
said was that all of Anancy's friends talked to each other.
You see, you must listen carefully. Sometimes it might
seem to you that I am asking the same question over and
over, but please think about it each time and answer me.
Finally, I'll ask you to tell me the story in your own
words so that I can write it down.
We'll play the game four times then I'll ask you to
help make up a story about Anancy. I'll explain
more about
the story when we come to it. If you get tired and don't
want to go on, we will stop.
142
Appendix E
Socioeconomic Questionnaire
1. Have you worked outside of the house sometime in the
last year?
»^lhat did you do? (A TASK not a place of work)
2
.
How old are you now?
3. How far did you reach in school?
4. Is that when you were a youngster?
How old were you when you finished school?
5. Did you ever attend a JAMAL class?
What level did you enter?
How long did you study in JAMAL?
What was the color of your last book?
What level did you finish?
How many years ago was that?
6. Tell me now, how much time did you spend reading last
week?
7 . What kinds of things did you read?
8. What newspapers or magazines did you read last week?
The Daily News ; The Sunday Sun ; The Gleaner ;
The Star.

